Alexander Mikaberidze (amik78@hotmail.com) Peter Bagration "The Lion of the Russian Army" Chapter I Peter (Ivanovich) Bagration descended from an ancient Dynasty of the Georgian kings - Bagrations. Their genealogy comes from region Tao-Klarjeti ("Kingdom of the Georgians") that can be singled out among provinces of Georgia. In the second half of the 10th century, during the rule of the distinguished political figure David Kuropalates, great-great forefather of the Peter Bagration. ("Kuropalates" is a honour title given by the Emperor of the Byzantine Empire), Tao-Klarjeti became a large and powerful principality, whose southern borders reached lake Van and the town of Erzink (Erzincan). The growth and consolidation of this principality contributed to an expansion of its cultural and economic ties with other kingdoms and principalities. King David Kuropalates even interfered in some internal affairs of the Byzantine Empire. Thus, in 1079, during a rebellion against the Emperor Basil, David Kuropalates sent him reinforcement troops led by Tornike Eristavi, thereby helping the monarch of the great Byzantine Empire to save his throne and his empire. David Kuropalates' name was known throughout the Orient, where he commanded great authority. The Armenian historian Stepanos Taronets, a contemporary of David, wrote: "The great David Kuropalates surpassed all the rulers of our time ... He established peace and good will in all eastern states, especially, in Armenia and Georgia. He put an end to wars...and defeated all the peoples living around, and all monarchs submitted to his authority of their own free will". David Kuropalates initiated the political unification of Georgia. Supported by Joane Marushisdze, his contemporary Kartlian (Iberia) Eristavi and active political figure, David Kuropalates raised his adopted son Bagrat Bagration to the throne of Kartli (Iberia) (in 975) and Abkhazia (in 978), thereby actually uniting Eastern and Western Georgia into a single state. Since then a new royal dynasty of Bagrations originated and governed over Georgia throughout of almost 900 years. Among the ancestors of P. Bagration there were such prominent Kings and statesmen, like the greatest King of Georgia David IV the Builder, who liberated the country from Seljuks and defeated on Didgori valley on 12 August, 1121 by an army in 55,000 men a coalition of all Muslim State in 450,000 men; legendary empress Tamar, the period of which reign was a "Gold Century" in a history of Georgia; King George VI the Brilliant, who expelled in 1334 Mongolians from Georgia and released those Georgian monasteries on the Sacred Earth, that were taken by Muslims; King George VII, who fought with most furious enemy of Georgia, Temur (Tamerlan) who invaded 8 times in Georgia during 14 years, have razed it to the ground, but could not managed to conquer it; Kings Bagrat V, Luarsab, Simon, Irakli II and many others, who assemble the Glory of the Georgia... Among the ancestors of Peter Bagration, there was a king Vakhtang VI, outstanding state and public figure of Georgia of first half of XVIII. In 1723 after several years of struggle with Iran and Turkey, Vakhtang VI was compelled, together with retinue of 1200 men, to abandon Georgia. The nephew of king Vakhtang VI, Alexander Bagration (son of Vakhtang's brother - Jese), who stayed in Georgia for struggle against Turks, also was forced in 1757 to move in Russia, where he has continue a military service in Russian army. He took part in a grade of the lieutenant colonel in battle actions of Russian armies on Northern Caucasus on a defense of southeast borders of Russian Empire. There passed a military service his son Ivan Bagration. Up to a grade of the colonel, Ivan Bagration has left in a resignation and put up in city of Kizlyar, where in 1765 his son Peter, future famous Russian commander, was born. The children's years Peter carried out in the parental house. Unfortunately, any certain items of information about this part of his life have not reached up to us. It is possible to assume, that, being brought up in family of officer, Peter frequently heard the stories of his father about the spent fights and campaigns, about the courageous struggle of the native people against enemies. Maybe for this reason, since early years, he has shown large interest and love to military business, dreaming to devote itself to a trade of the militarian. "With the milk of my mother, I have poured in myself a spirit of dash bravery" - wrote subsequently Peter Bagration. Soon his dream was fulfilled. On February 21, 1782 17-year's Bagration has started a military service. He was enlisted as the sergeant in Caucasian Musketeer Regiment. His military career of almost 30 years has began. Caucasian Musketeer Regiment, together with other parts of Russian army, defended southern border of Russian Empire which was taking place on the rivers of Kuban and Terek. Ottoman Empire, holding then in the submission a significant territory of Caucasus, organized continuous attacks on Russian borders. Sometimes it managed to involve in participation in these attacks groups of separate princes ("Knyaz") of Northern Caucasus. To Russian armies, who were deployed on the Caucasian border, it was essential to be constantly in a condition of battle readiness and to reflect to enemy's attacks. In one of fights with Highlanders (particularly with Chechens), Peter Bagration was wounded and left on a field of fight among the killed and wounded soldiers. Chechens, who were assembling the weapon and accepted young Bagration for one of them, picked him up. They have picked up and relieved him and then having learned who he is, out of respect for his father, who has rendered to them assistance at one time, has allocated without the repayment to military quarters of Russians. In structure of Caucasian Musketeer Regiment, Bagration participated in campaigns of 1783, 1784, 1785 and 1786, having shown himself as a brave and courageous soldier, prepared to bear all difficulties of military life. On experience of severe fights with enemies he closely studied military business and gave back it all forces. In 1788 Caucasian Musketeer Regiment was directed to fortress Ochakov, to participate in dashing actions on mastering by this strong Turkish stronghold. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army was Gregory Potyemkin, at those times, powerful favorite of the Empress Ekaterina. Alexander Suwaroff, the greatest Russian commander, leaded the left wing of the army. Still prior to the beginning battle, he has offered to Potyemkin the courageous plan of mastering fortress by a method of decisive storm. However commander-in-chief has rejected this plan, having ordered to begin a gradual siege of fortress. Owing to the large disagreements with Potyemkin on conducting battle actions, Suwaroff was compelled to leave from under Ochakov. Only after some months, when the siege has not given positive results, Potyemkin was convinced of correctness of the Suwaroff's plan accepted it and has decided to storm Ochakov. On 6 December (17), 1788 Russians attacked Ochakov and gained a complete victory. In time of assault, Bagration has shown the large bravery. He battled with a great courage and was among the first, who rushed into a fortress. After a capture of Ochakov, Bagration has come back to Caucasus, where took part in a military campaign of 1790. Bagration served in Caucasian Musketeer Regiment till June 1792 and consecutively pass all steps of a military service from the sergeant up to the captain. Since June 1792 till May 1794 he served in Kiev Cavalry Regiment in grades of a second major and premier-major. On 4 May 1794 he was transferred in Sofia Carabineers Regiment. He participated in structure of this regiment during the Polish campaign of 1794, which was headed by A. Suwaroff. In fights and campaigns 1783-1794 Bagration has shown himself as a skilful commander. His characteristic features were exclusive calmness and boundless bravery in fight, speed and resoluteness of actions, skill to use the convenient moment for drawing impact on an enemy. The glory about courage and fearlessness of Bagration was widely spread among the soldiers and officers. A. Suwaroff has paid attention to Bagration. He cordially has grown fond of Bagration and tenderly refer to him - "Prince Peter" ("Knyaz Peter") and did not hide the special respect and trust to him. On 15 October 1794 Bagration has received a grade of the lieutenant colonel. In 1798 he was already a colonel, commander of the 6-th Regiment, and on next year received grade of general-major and has taken part in famous Italian and Swiss campaigns of Russian army, with which the extremely bright page of his military biography opens. During the Italian campaign of 1799 the general-major Bagration, leading the avant guard of the Russian army, has taken by assault a citadel of Breshia (April 10), attacked and has occupied Lecco and was wounded by a bullet in a leg, but continued fight and supervised over fight. On April 16 the French army was broken by A. Suwaroff on the river Adda, the Milan was engaged, and on turn there was a ferry through the river Po. Bagration, who headed the avant guard, forwarded through it on April 21 and was set to Tortona. On April 28 Bagration has advanced to a fortress Alessandria and by this movement stopped direct communications of the French with Genoa. On May 6, according to a disposition of Suwaroff, Bagration hastened to St. Juliano, to make lateral avant guard of army at flank movement to river Cesia. Having heard shots at Marengo, Bagration has turned to support Austrians and magnanimously has conceded general leadership to younger in a grade, general Luiziany, then attached to him from both flanks and has carried away the allies in prompt attack with drum-type fight. When one of the French columns tried to bypass the right flank of the allies, Bagration with 7th Regiment and Cossacks has beaten off impact. Attempt of the French to break in Genoa has not managed. On June 6 in the morning, news has come that McDonald attacked Austrians (general Tott) on Tidone. Suwaroff immediately has taken avant guard and together with Bagration hastened to a place of fight. At three o'clock in the afternoon he was already there and has detained the French by the valiant cavalry attack up to the approach of infantry. When it (infantry) has seemed, Bagration approached to Suwaroff and, probably not understanding the importance of minute, in a low voice asked him to delay with attack, before the infantry will not approach, since in some of battalions there were less than 40 men. Suwaroff answered him: "But McDonald have not even 20 men, attack with the God! Hurrah!" Bagration immediately obeyed and have struck on the enemy and rejected him in the large disorder for Tidone. McDonald has collected the army on Tidone and made a new attack on Russian army on June 7, during which Bagration was wounded. However, the second wound of Bagration in this campaign has not deduced him out of operation. On August 4 at Novi, Suwaroff has assigned Bagration to carry out a resolute impact. Then the legendary campaign of Russian army through Alps to Switzerland has followed. Bagration went in the head of the army, first took up all impacts of the opponent, first overcoming all barrier, which were put by a wild nature of mountains; then he led the avant guard constraining attacks of the French; and finally, when at last Russian armies got out safely from that entrapment, in which they were placed not only by opponent, but also by the ally (Austrians), only 16 officers and 300 bottom grades were remained in Bagration's Regiment. He was wounded for third time during this war in battle at Klyontal. After returning in Russia Bagration was appointed the chief of Jager Regiment. With the beginning of the war of Russia with Napoleon, in 1805, Bagration was entrusted the avant guard of Russian army, but when the army entered frontiers of Austria, thanking to capitulation of allied Austrian army under Ulm, the 40-thousand Russian Regiment, having in rear Danube, encountered several French armies. Kutusoff began hasty deviation to Russian borders, and the avant guard of Bagration became a rear guard of the army and during 400 miles, by a number of persistent fights (at Laymbakh, Amshteten and Krems) - constrained the opponent and has given Russian army an opportunity to get out of this trap. But hardly it has passed at Krems on the left coast of Danube, as Vienna has surrendered to Napoleon, and last, in turn, passing over Danube, has rushed to Znaim on a way of deviation of Kutusoff from Krems to Brunn, the capital of Moravia. This time situation of Russian army became even more critical. And second time Bagration rescued it. Kutusoff's men were so weary that they could proceed no farther without a rest, and from Schrattenthal he sent back Bagration, to Hollabrunn, with six thousand of the freshest troops, to check the French advance and to detain the French by all means, even if for this purpose it would be necessary to sacrifice all regiment. Believing the main army of Kutusoff to be before him, Murat felt unable to engage. Accordingly he dispatched a messenger under a flag of truce with the statement, purely fictitious, though speciously based on certain irrelevant facts, that negotiations had been opened for a general armistice. Kutusoff, pretending to be familiar with the details of the falsehood, heartily entered into a proposition to negotiate, using the time thus gained to prepare his further retreat. A paper was duly drawn up, signed, and sent to Napoleon at Schonbrunn. The Emperor, seeing how Murat had been outwitted, immediately sent off an adjutant to him with peremptory orders to attack at once. When this command arrived at Hollabrunn, Soult had come in with three divisions, but Kutusoff with his army was far away on the highroad to Znaim. On November 4, near Hollabrunn, Bagration has sustained furious assaults of two French armies within 8 hours. He has not abandoned a position even when Division of Legran has gone to his rear. When Bagration received news that Kutusoff passed Znaim with the main forces and was outside of danger, Bagration leaded his Regiment and laid by bayonets a way through a ring of the French armies and burning settlements of Hollabrunn and Grund and has joined army. Napoleon had by this time come up to take charge in person, but it was too late: Murat had "destroyed the fruits of a campaign." Near Brunn, Kutusoff met the Vienna garrison, and at Wischau the united force of forty-five thousand men joined the first detachment, fourteen thousand strong, of a second Russian army, which was advancing under Buxhowden. For this brilliant feat Bagration was made in the general-lieutenant, and the 6-th Jager Regiment, first among others in Russian army, has received as an award silver trumpets with stripes of St. George. After connection of Kutusoff with the column of Buxhowden, Bagration again became on the head of avant guard. On ways to Austerlitz, Bagration break the French at Wischau and Raustnitsa. On December 2, 1805 on Austerlitz field, the avant guard of Bagration has made extreme right flank of a battle arrangement of allied army and when the columns of its center were beaten, has undergone severe assaults of the victorious opponent, but has resisted and covered deviation of the broken army. For Austerlitz, Bagration was awarded with order of St. George of 2 class. In campaign 1806-1807 Bagration again was the chief of avant guard or rear guar of Russian army, depending on the success of Russians. Thus, with continuous within 3 days battle, Bagration covered deviation of Russian army from Jashma to Preussisch-Eylau during 70 miles, and took part in battle at Preussisch-Eylau (26 and January 27), on 27-th he supervised over actions not only of his guard, but also of Dokhturov's Regiment, who was wounded and left out of operation. Having received an order of the commander-in-chief general Benningsen, to beat out the French from Preussisch-Eylau by all means, Bagration, having hastened, with a banner in a hand leaded an assault and took into possession that location. However Russian army nevertheless was compelled to recede to Konigsberg and this movement was made under covering of Bagration's group. As Napoleon, not having developed the success, also has departed for Paarga, Benningsen again passes in approach. Bagration, mastering the avant guard, occupied Gulshtadt and, continuing a march further, attacked on May 24 enemy at Altkirkhen, forced down them after six-hour fight with rather favorable positions, pursued and completed a victory by a new defeat the next day at village Ankerdorf. Attacked on May 28 by the opponent's cavarly, Bagration persistently defended at Gutshtadt, then detained a ferry of the French through Alle and gave to Russian army time to strengthen positions at Gelsberg. Then Bagration has covered the withdrawal of Russian army as well as its deviation to Bartenshtein, remaining in Gelsberg till morning of May 31. In battle at Fridland the group of Bagration was deployed on the left flank of an arrangement of Russian army. When Russians have not sustained and in frustration have begun to recede, Bagration with a sword in hands began to encourage soldiers of the Moscow Grenadier Regiments, which rests have surrounded his horse, reminding the soldiers their feats in Italy with Suwaroff . . . But all was vain. For 16 hours has stayed Bagration in this severe fight and then for 5 day constrained of the opponent pursuing Russian broken army, gone to Tilsit. For the battle at Fridland, Bagration was awarded with a gold sword decorated with diamonds, with an inscription "For brave". Despite of an extreme pressure of the forces during campaign 1805-1807 Bagration has accepted appointment on theatre of war with Sweden (1808-1809) and become the Hero of this war. Nominated as a commander of 21st Infantry Regiment, he has broken in night with 15 on February 16 of the general Adlerkreits at Artchio, 28-th - has occupied Tamerfor, on March 4 has put a defeat to the Swedish commander -in-chief to the general Klingspor at Biernerborg and, pursuing him within 8 days for 200 miles on disgusting roads, has occupied on 10 of March Abo, on 12 - Khristianshtadt, 26 th - Vase, on March 31 - Aland islands. Disease caused by the amplified continuous works, compelled Bagration to leave temporarily army. Having restored the forces, he has returned to Finland in the autumn of 1808 and on September 16 defeated generals Boye and Lanshtisgauzen at Gelsing. To put to the Swedes resolute impact, the emperor Alexander has made the plan of a winter campaign of Russian army on ice a Botnic gulf to Stockholm. Not only majority of the generals in army, but also commanders-in-chief spoke against such operation and hesitated with the beginning. And only Bagration, not reasoning in essence, has answered the count Arakcheev, sent by the Emperor to organize this campaign: "Let's order - shall go"'. Nominated by the chief of one of three columns, Bagration should proceed from Abo to Sweden through Aland islands. The last were engaged within 6 day, and the avant guard under Kulnev has reached the Swedish coast and grasped Grisselgam in vicinities of Stockholm. In the beginning of August 1809 Bagration was nominated as a commander of the Moldavian army acting against Turkey. The historian of epoch of the end 18th and beginning 19 th E. Shumigorsky believes that such fast moving Bagration from Finland, where the war was already terminated, to Turkey, where it lasted without results for third year, was, in effect, for him (Bagration) the honourable disgrace. The Royal Court in St.-Petersburg did not wish more to see him in capital, due to intimate issues. Of average growth, thin, brawny brunette with the typical Georgian hooked nose, that gave occasion to a number of witticisms and jokes (Once, Denis Davidov came to Bagration and told him that an enemy is very close - already "on their nose". Bagration calmly replied - "on whose nose? If mine, we have enough time to have a breakfast. If yours, we have to hurry!"), Bagration was ill-looking, but all figure made strong impression: the soldiers called him "the Eagle". But the glory and reputation of Suwaroff's disciple made stronger impression. On this ground, probably, there was devotion by him of great princess Ekaterina Pavlovna, who was at the age of 18-20 years. To put the end, great princess was give out in marriage for Prince George of Oldenburg in April 1809. But as Bagration did not want to reconcile to this fact, he was promoted to the General of Infantry and directed to Moldavia. Having arrived here, Bagration carried out the military actions with usual speed and resoluteness. Having in army only 20 thousand man, he, not removing blockade Ismail, has taken on August 18 Machin, on 22 - Fursov, on 29th - Kustenji., on the 4th of September, defeated at the Rossevat the perfect turkish armies, the on 11 - has besieged Silistria, on 14th - has taken Ismail, and on 27th - Brailov. Great Vezir with armies equal to force Russian troops, has hurried to Silistria. Bagration has met and defeated him on October 10 at Tataritsa. But when it became known, that other armies of the great Vezir rushed to Silistria, Bagration has decided to remove the siege and on October 14 has allocated the armies on the left coast of Danube, intending to renew military actions in the spring and with more significant forces. But the Royal Court in St.-Petersburg remained very dissatisfied, and in March, 1810, Count H. Kamensky was sent to substitute Bagration. Awarded for turkish war by an order of St. Andrew, Bagration was appointed as a the commander-in-chief of the 2 nd Western Army. Peter Bagration Hero of the Great Pariotic War 1812 (I) "There are no good generals In Russia. The exception makes Bagration" Napoleon, 1812. "Bagration is a Lion of the Russian Army" I. Chernishev Chapter II Napoleon used infringement by Russia of conditions Tilzit peace agreement as a pretext for the begining of war. He aspired to isolate Russia and to use in war against her all basic West-European states. Governments of these states, trembling before Napoleon, have started obediently to deploy armies. On 12 February, 1812 the king of Prussia has signed with Napoleon the agreement about joint actions against Russia and has undertaken to expose the 20-thousand Regiment with 60 canons, and also to provide the French army with the foodstuffs during its progress through Prussian territory. On 2 March, 1812 the similar treaty with Austria was made. The Austrian emperor promised to expose the 30-thousand army with 60 pieces of artillery. Only Sweden, having incurred heavy casualties in war 1808-1809, did not go for Napoleon and has concluded on March 24, 1812 the allied agreement with Russia. Also, unsuccessful was Napoleon's attempt to ally with Turkey. As a result of a rout by Russian army under command of M. Kutusoff of Turkish army in 1811, the Turkish government was compelled to sign on 16 May, 1812 the Bucharest Peace Treaty, one of which conditions was the obligation of Turkey to keep neutrality in case of war between Russia and France. Despite of these two failures, Napoleon nevertheless has managed to form an extensive coalition, led by France, that possessed huge material resources. Simultaneously with diplomatic preparation the strengthened preparation of necessary forces and means was developed. This preparation was carried out in unusual before that time scales. "Never till now, I did not do of so extensive preparations" - declared Napoleon. By continuous mobilization in France and among the population of other states, under French dominion, Napoleon has put under a gun 1200 thousand men, from which 600 thousand were inside the country and 600 thousand with 1372 pices of artillery have made the so-called "Great Army" and intend for war against Russia. The army of Napoleon differed by the large variety of the parts, entering into her. Besides actually the French armies, it included armies almost of all nationalities of then Europe: from Italy, Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Westphalia, Saxony, Poland and others. The significant part of the foreigners serving in "Grand army" was violently recruited and was hostilely concerned to the future actions. These circumstances as well as many others, did not promote maintenance in army a discipline and high moral spirit. Nevertheless it had good battle training, had skilled command structure, still trusted in authority of Napoleon and consequently, despite of lacks, represented very puissant force. The large attention was given to preparation of rear and material maintenance of armies. In fortresses on r. Visla the huge stocks of the foodstuffs concentrated and the warehouses of an ammunition were created, the hospitals were developed, the road network was improved. Extensive preparations of the French government to war against Russia, required from the Russian Royal Court immediate performing of effective measures on organization of a reliable defense of the state. However the Royal Court, knowing about approaching danger, has failed to prepare properly the country for repulse of enemy invasion. First of all imperial government has appeared powerless to draft the concrete plan of wars under the certain circumstances. On the eve of war on the part of a number of military plans and drafts concerning possible character of actions against France were submitted to government. The preference was given up to the plan made by the military adviser of Czar Alexander I, general Full, former Prussian officer. Recognizing that the frontier strip of Russia was divided by bogs of Polesye on two parts - northern and southern, Full supposed probable approach of the napoleonic army only on one direction: either to the north from Polesye or to the south of it. In this connection he offered to generate two armies and to arrange first In northern part of a frontier strip, and second - in southern. In case of approach of the opponent to the north from Polesye, the first army should recede to empowered camp, that was necessary to put up at Dryss on Western Dvina, and to hold down there coming armies of the opponent. In the meantime second army should act on enemy's flank and rear. If the opponent has passed in approach to the south from Polesye, the second army was obliged to recede to Jitomyr and Kyiv, and the first army - to act on rears and communications of the coming opponent. This plan was vicious in the basis. It does not take into account an opportunity of conducting by the opponent of simultaneous approach on both specified directions. And it is at the moment when against Russia approached Napoleon himself, who was wage triumphant war with all Europe for 15 years already. Besides division, provided by this plan, of Russian army into two groups, isolated one from another by un-passable strip of Polesye, created favorable conditions for the opponent to rout them in parts. Nevertheless Alexander, blindly trusting in authority of the adviser, has accepted the plan and has put it in a basis of waging of war with France. According to this plan to the north of Polesye, in area of Vilno, the 1st Western army was deployed, and to the south from Polesye, in area of Lunk - the 2 nd Western army. On Western Dvina at Dryssa, the urgent construction of the so-called "Camp of Dryss" began. In the spring of 1812 the imperial government has made attempt to improve strategic expansion of Russian army by rapprochement of 1st and 2 nd Western armies. With this purpose the 2nd Western army was re-located to north from Polesye, at first, in area Pruzhan, and then - Wolkovisk. In area Lunk, on a place of a former arrangement of 2nd Western army, 3rd Western army was convened. However this measure has not resulted in radical improvement of strategic expansion of Russian army. Even after this actions, the military forces of Russia, located on western border, remained stretched and shattered. Directly ahead of beginning of military actions the strategic expansion of military forces of Russia on western border was the following: The 1st Western army in structure of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6-th infantry, 1 st and 2nd cavarly and one corpus of Cossacs, with a total number of 127 thousand men at 558 canons settled down at the front of 180 kms from Rossyena up to Lyda, having put forward a Cossac corpus in area of Grodno. The 2nd Western army in structure of 7-th and 8-th infantry, 4-th cavalry and nine Cossack corps, with a total number of 36 thousand men at 180 canons (not considering 27-th infantry division, included in structure, on 9 May, 1812 and taking place in ways from Moscow) settled down at the front of 100 kms in area Wolkovysk, having Cossacks deployed along border. The 3rd Western army with an aggregate number in 43 thousand men with 165 canons was located in area Lunk. The break between 1st and 2nd Western armies reaches 100 kms, and between 2nd and 3rd armies - 200 kms. The total number of military forces of Russia resisting on western border to army of Napoleon, made 210 thousand men with 903 canons. The government has not created a single commander headquarters. In case of separated forces, it strongly complicated interaction of armies. The construction of defensive structures was developed unsufficiently. In frontier areas the repair and strengthening of fortresses began, as well as construction of a number of new fortresses and bastions. However all these works were carried extremely slowly and to the beginning of military actions were not finished. Organization of material maintenance of armies was in a poor condition. Although, in many places, especially along the rivers of Western Dvina, Berezina and Dnepr, food warehouses were built. Thus, to the moment of intrusion of napoleonic army, the situation in Russia and its armed forces was quite unclear. The opponent had the overwhelming numerical superiority. The Russian armies were developed unsuccessfully, they had not single commander-in-chief and real plan of conducting war. Napoleon, having huge forces and means, intended to destroy Russian army in a frontier strip and then, by fast promotion of the armies, to take possession of Moscow and to dictate of Russia of a condition of armistice. Napoleon has expressed strategic importance of possesing Moscow by the following words: "If I occupy Kyiv, I shall take Russia for legs; if I acquire St. Petersburg, I shall take it for a head; having occuping Moscow, I shall spear Russia in its heart" According to this plan in the beginning of June, 1812. Napoleon has deployed the army near Visla on a line Warsaw - Konisgberg, in three groups: the left wing, centre, right wing. The left wing in structure of 1st, 2nd and 3rd infantry, 1st and 2nd cavalry corps and French guards by an aggregate number in 220 thousand men with 527 canons, was under Napoleon's command. The central group under command of the vice-roy of Italy Eugene de Beauharnais consisted of 4th and 6th infantry, 3rd Cavarly corps and Italian Royal Guards by a total number of 85 thousands men with 208 canons. The right wing in structure 5th , 7 th and 8th infantry, 4th cavalry corps with a total number of 75 thousand men with 166 canons was under leadership of Napoleon's brother - Jerome Bonaparte. The left flank of Napoleon's army was provided with 30-thousand prussian corps of Marshal McDonald, and right - 35-thousand Austrians of general Swartsemberg. Besides Napoleon had large reserves (160 thousand men), that were deployed in Prussia. The main impact should be rendered to the left wing with a task to cross Neman, defeat the 1st Western army of Russians and take in possession Vilno. Central group of corps was necessary to supprot left wing in performance of the task. The task of right wing corps was to hold down armies of 2nd Western army to prevent its movement to north on connection with 1 st Western army and by that to enable left wing and central corps to destroy 1 st Western army and to take in possession Vilno. In further army of the right wing was supposed to share with other forces in resolute actions against 2 nd Western army. In night for 12 June, 1812 the left wing of the French army begun a ferry through Neman at Kovko (nowadays Kaunas). The War began. After resignation of a post of the commander-in-chief of Moldavian army, Bagration was not at businesses for some time. Only on 7 August, 1811 the imperial decree about his assignment as commander-in-chief of Podolsk army (which settled down on Ukraine in Kiev, Volynsk and Podolsk provinces) has followed. In the beginning of September, 1811 Bagration arrivied to Podolsk army, and by spring of 1812 was authorized to hold a post of the commander-in-chief of 2 nd Western army, that generated on the basis of Podolsk army. The new army at first settled down in Lupk area, and then was relocated to Volkovysk area. This army covered major western strategic direction and it assigned on Bagration responsiblilty to defend borders of Russia. Facing to the extensive military preparations of France, Bagration showed a large concern for destiny of the native land and took concrete measures in interests of maintenance of safety of the country. One of steps in this direction was the development by him of the plan of campaign 1812, which was stated in special report to czar Alexander. Characterizing the situation that has been occured in Europe, Bagration marked, that in the unlimited aspiration to a gain of world domination Napoleon took over many European peoples and that the real threat to undergo the ssame fate has hung above Russia. " He (Napoleon) is waiting for an appropriate minute to set up an ardent banner on limits of your empire !" - wrote Bagration to Alexander. Considering war inevitable, Bagration recommended Alexander to accept urgent measures for the safety of Russia and to protect the country from a sudden attack of an enemy. In these purposes he offered to direct immediately to the French government the Note, in which, on the one hand, to state about means accepted by Russian government for maintenance of the world between Russia and France, and on the other hand to specify all actions of Napoleon directed against peaceful intentions of Russia. Having confirmed readiness of Russian government to aspire henceforth to preservation and strengthening of relations between both states, the Note should also made to the French government an offer on an establishment border line on Oder river or any other boundary. Through this boundary napoleonic army should not pass. The transition of this boundary by armies, even by one battalion, should be considered by Russia as the announcement of war. To opinion of Bagration, establishment of a such border line could serve a sufficient guarantee ensuring Russia from a sudden attack of an enemy. Simultaneously with departure of the Note Bagration advised to carry out the following measures on preparation of Russian armies: 1. To strengthen the armies, located on western border, having developed them in two groups: one in area Belostoc by number in 100 thousand man with enough of artillery, and another in Baltic area in structure not less to than five divisions, having supplied it not only field, but also, as far as it is possible, by siege artillery, completely supplied with an ammunition; 2. To arrange spare armies by number in 50 thousand man in the second line, on distance of 1OO-150 miles from these armies making the main army. This group was necessary for using depending on conditions; 3. To found beforehand warehouses for uninterrupted maintenance of armies by the foodstuffs They would contain not less than annual stock of the foodstuffs and fodder on 250-thousand army, and also to prepare vehicles for transportation of a monthly stock of the foodstuffs and fodder on 150-thousand army; 4. To result in battle readiness the Baltic fleet. Bagration considered as most probable, that Napoleon in interests of a prize of necessary time for expansion of the army will hesitate with the answer to the specified Note and "not looking on anything" throw armies through offered to him border line. In this case Bagration offered to put forward to Visla an army located at Belostoc and to occupy Warsaw. The armies, located in Baltic area on border with East Prussia, must be put forward to Graudents on the same day and with the same speed, then proceed to Visla and with an assistance of the Baltic fleet to take possession of Gdansk After the first line it was necessary to move also armies of the second line. The further plans of military actions were provided to be defined depending on actions of the opponent. "... Main...advantage of such sudden and speed movement, adviced by me, - wrote Bagration, - is, that the theatre of war will leave from limits of empire and that we shall be in a condition to occupy on Visla such a position that would provide us with an opportunity to act against opponent with a great courage. . . " Bagration well understood, that future war will be waged with large pressure from both parties, and consequently recommended to create beforehand reliable reserves to supply the main forces. He offered to arrange the third line, on a distance of 100-150 miles from spare armies, in a structure of recruits, trained in special depots, and besides to recruit more soldiers. These are the basic features of the plan of campaign 1812 drafted by Bagration. The analysis of this plan testifies about deep and correct estimation of Bagration of conditions on the eve of intrusion of napoleonic army. The measures, planned by him, carried active character and provided reliable protection of Russia against a sudden attack of an enemy. The large interest is represented by the basic idea of the Bagration's plan - . . . . . . of the opponent in drawing the first impact. Bagration's plan, as well as valuable suggestion of many other military figures on a question of conducting war against France, was not accepted by imperial government. At the same time it does not inform Bagration neither about the general plan (Full's plan) of conducting war, nor about a concrete task, which was assigned on 2-nd Western army. Concerned by such situation Bagration has requested on 17 April 1812 from the minister of war. Barclay de Tolly the general plan of military actions. "I believe, - wrote Bagration, - that before beginning of military actions I shall receive on this account the most detailed remarks from Your Excellency, for you are more aware of the political businesses and items, on which an opponent shall throw the forces" However the answer has not followed. Only on 3 June, that is for 9 days prior to the beginning of war, the headquarters of the 2nd Western army received three instructions of Barclay de Tolly dated 1 June, in which on behalf of Czar Alexander, the first instructions on character of future actions and task of Bagration's army were given. According to them the task of 2 Western army was reduced to conducting defensive actions. It was offered to abstain from offensive actions. "When it will be decided conudct offensively, then Your . . . . will be informed, in appropriate time about the general plan of operations, but before its reception you must conduct defensive operations" In case of transition in approach of superior forces of the opponent, it was necessary for the 2nd Western army to recede at first to river Sharu, and then to Novogrudoc and river Neman, where it should receive the further instructions either about continuation of deviation through Minsk to Borisov or about movement on north in the shortest way to incorporate to 1-st Western army. Bagration was offered to familiarize with a condition of Bobruisk and Borisov and to begin immediately strengthening Nesvij. Besides he was ordered to establish communication with general-lieutenant Eytel's corps, which in structure of 18 spare battalions, 16 squadrons and two Cosscaks regiments was formed at Mozyr to defend Pripyat, and also with 3rd Western army, Platov's corps and armies of the left wing of the 1st Western army. Carrying out the received instructions Bagration has sent the staff officers for recognition of road Volkovysc-Zelva-Slonim and ferries through river Shara from its mouth up to Bitten. To the military engineer the general-major Ferster was entrusted to examine Nesvij and to present opinions about measures on its strengthening, also to survey a fortress of Bobruisk and redoubt at Borysov, to make recognition of roads from Nesvij to Borysov and Bobruisk, and also between these two items. The communication with the commander of the reserve corps general-lieutenant Eytel was established and found out the number of corps, their) arrangement, and accommodation area. Having begun to perform received instructions, Bagration at the same time has addressed on June 6 to Alexander I the letter in which has stated the reasons of an estimation of present conditions and outlined plan of actions. Having stipulated, that, not being entered in circle of political questions, he will speak only about subjects that are known for him on the basis of battle experience, Bagration has subjected to sharp criticism strategic expansion of Russian army, marking the following its main defects: 1. Russian armies were deployed on the much stretched front and in case of intention of the opponent to put strong impact on one of them it was impossible to support it. 2. Russian armies were located too close to border and they had not time to concentrate for repulse the opponent, if last approach by superior forces on any one direction. 3. An unsuccessful expansion of Russian armies allowed the opponent to prevent their connection. Sharply criticizing strategic expansion of Russian army, Bagration resolutely has condemned also outlined plan of actions. Thus he especially emphasized the extremely negative consequences, which will be caused in armies by a deviation. To avoid it, Bagration again has confirmed the idea on necessity to not wait for an attack of an enemy, and to break its intentions by conducting on actions. "... Much more useful would be, without waiting for an attack, to fight in its borders" - specified Bagration. After this letter, on 8 June, Bagration has directed to Alexander I another letter, in which, again marking negative consequences of deviation, insisted on necessity of drawing of the first impact on an enemy. "Order to us to assemble at Grodno and attack enemy - wrote Bagration - Any deviation encourages rival and gives him great ways in this territory, and takes away our spirit... What are we afraiding of and why we have to exhaust army . . . ?". On 11 June Bagration received Barclay de Tolly's answer. Barclay informed Bagration, that given to him instruction on a case of deviation, does not mean refusal from offensive actions and that he will receive additional instructions in due time. However, the military minister wrote, the care requires to be prepared to deviation, that Russian armies have not appeared compelled to be involved in resolute battle with superior forces of an enemy in unprofitable conditions. Bagration was informed also, that the order to provide the left flank of 2nd Western army was sent to the commander -in-chief of 3rd Western army general Tormasov. Thus, in the Barclay de Tolly's letter did not answeredon Bagration's major questions connected to unsuccessful expansion of Russian armies and passive character of strategy. Also it followed from the letter, that the supreme command was going to support further Full's plan. As for the statement of the military minister concerning an opportunity of transition to offensive actions, obviously, it was purpose only to calm Bagration. It is quite clear, that Barclay de Tolly's reply could not satisfy Bagration. On 12 June he again sent a letter to the military minister, asking to report to Alexander I about the situation of 2nd Western army, and also about necessity to carry out urgent measures on maintenance of Russian armies from sudden impact of an enemy. Bagration again marked the stretched disposition of 2nd Western army, which, having only two corps and unsufficient number of cavalry, was compelled to occupy a hundred miles. In this situation, reported Bagration, the army will not have an opportunity to prevent intentions of rival in case of intrusion at Grodno and Belostoc. Besides Bagration paid attention to the large break between 2nd and 3 rd Western armies. To liquidate this break, he offered to pull together 3rd Western army to 2nd, by concenrating the 3rd army at Kovel, and to put its right flank to Kobryn. "In that ratio of the third army with the second - wrote Bagration - we shall find itself in ways to repulse opponent, as in opposite very much divided for loss mutual assisstance from one to another" At last, Bagration marked, that 2 nd reserve corps of general-lieutenant Ertel, located at Mozyr, was too remote to render assisstance to the 2nd Army. On Bagration's accounts, for forwarding of this corp to 2 nd or 3rd Armies, it would be required not less than 10 days. Therefore he offered to approach the corp to armies of both armies, having arranged it at Pynsk. Fairly specifying on expansion of Russian army, Bagration rightly foresaw also possible way of actions of the opponent. Under present situation), in his opinion, the best way of actions of the opponent will be rout of Russian army by parts. "His indispensable benefit is to divide our forces, and he, in my opinion, will try to take advantage of it" - informed Bagration. On 13 June the instruction of Barclay de Tolly, dated on 12 June about change of a task of 2 Western army has arrived. The instruction stated, that in connection with accumulation of enemy forces between Kovno and Meretsh and a ferry, expected on 12 June of the opponent through Neman, the Cossacks corp of Platov was ordered to act from area of Grodno in flank and rear of the opponent. 2nd Western army should assisst Cossacks in performance of this task by protecting its rear. At the same time Borysov was specified as a point where it was necessary for the 2 nd Western army to recede. Further instruction informed Bagration, that if 1st Western army will not manage to give the opponent battle Vilno, it will be concentrated at Swentsyan where, can be, the battle will be given. On 14 June Bagration has received one more instruction of the military minister, in which, informing about a ferry of the French army through Neman at Kovno and about intention to concentrate the 1 st Western army at Vilno, Barclay de Tolly confirmed a task of 2 Western army stated in the instruction of 12 June. The new instructions of Barclay de Tolly did not facilitate a situation of 2nd Western army, and on the contrary, considerably complicated it. The army of Bagration was ordered to act in flank and rear of the opponent, but was not specified neither time of transition in approach, nor direction, in which it was necessary to go. Also. in the instructions nothing was spoken about the purpose, which was pursued by the planned actions. Besides the opponent, who has concentrated against 2nd Western army was not considered and, at last, the instructions of Barclay de Tolly, putting a new order, did not cancel previous order about deviation to Borysov. Upon reception of the first instruction, on 13 June, Bagration was directed to the military minister the report, in which marked insufficiency of forces of 2nd Western army for performance of the order. Simultaneously Bagration resolutely has condemned the assumption to concentrate 1 st Western army at Vilno. He considered, that in case of realization of this assumption, 2nd Western army will appear under threat of being cut off not only from 1-st Western army, but also from the line of deviation. "One correct review of a map, proves, that after deviation of 1-st army to Swentsyan, a rival, having occupiedVilno, can warn deviation of 2nd army to Minsk and on brevity of a way will be there before I shall reach there receding" - was written by Bagration. Besides Bagration considered that realization of the intended actions would result in break of communication between 2 nd and 3rd Western armies, and also in exception of any opportunity of their connection. The next day, after reception of the second instruction, Bagration sent a new report, in which again has emphasized, that the task, put before the 2 nd Western army, was unreal and that the attempt of performance will create extremely difficult conditions for connection of armies. Informing his opinion, Bagration asked the sanction to allocate 2 nd Western army on Shara river, and to recede up to Minsk. Getting decision about deviation to Minsk, Bagration well understood, what a huge importance in present conditions had an organization of interaction of armies of 2nd Western army and cossacks. Therefore he has sent to platov on 14 June the letter, in which specified the large threat which has hung above 2nd Western army and Cossacks. He wrote, that the opponent, having occupied Vilno on 16 or 17 June, can reach Minsk by June 24 and thus cut off ways for connection with 1 st Western army. Bagration advised Platov, in order to not be cut off from 1-st Western army, to follow with the corp on the right shore of Neman through Lyda on Minsk. He informed Platov, that in case of movement of his corp in the specified direction, 2nd Western army will concentrate in Slonym and will begin to recede Nesvyj under covering of Cossacks corp of general-major Ilovaysky. Bagration informed further, that after achievement of Nesvyj, Cossacks will be directed to north and, maintained by the main forces, can together with the Platov's corps render impacts on opponent and at the same time keep communication with 1-st Western army. In the letter Bagration wrote the following account of distances: "An opponent has 102 miles from Kovno up to Vilno, 200 miles from Vilno up to Minsk, 75 miles from Minsk up to Borysov, total 377. If it will take from Vilno a way on a direct road, rather convenient for transition of armies, having left Minsk on the right, then there are 321 miles up to Borysov; hence 18 less than mine path; since there are 59 miles from Volkovysk up to Slepym, 100 miles from Slepym up to Nesvij, 105 miles from Nesvij up to Minsk, 75 miles from Minsk up to Borysov. total 339 miles" Having informed Platov this account of distances, Bagration tried to assure him that the best direction for movement not only for the 2nd army, but also for Cossacks, was the direction on Minsk, as it gives the greatest opportunities to achieve connection with 1st Western Army. In another letter, Bagration told Platov about his negative attitude to idea of actions in flank and rear of the opponent. "To threaten in flank and rear is impossible for you, since they have considerable forces everywhere that means failures wherever you appear..". Bagration again has specified, that the most expedient way of actions was the deviation to Minsk. "... If I shall not receive the answer on my reports till tonight, I shall inform you about my deviation to Slonym Nesvyj and Minsk. That is all, that I can tell you. Better to help ther 1 st army there, rather than to be divided and wander here". Platov has agreed with the Bagration's proposal. On 15 June he has informed it(him), that the parts of the case will follow from Grodno on the right coast Iaiaia, "having about a direction on Minsk". The establishment of unity of sights between Bagration and Platov on character of forthcoming actions has played a positive role. It has ensured subsequently organization of close interaction between 2nd and Cossacs has rescued them from inevitable rout in parts. Besides an establishment of communication with Platov, Bagration has undertaken a number of measures having the purpose to not admi occupation by the opponent of Minsk. He has ordered 27-th infantry division, that was moving from Moscow on connection with 2nd Western army, to stop in Minsk and to defend it in case of approach of the opponent from Vilno. Also they were given the instruction to put forward in area of Minsk 12 reserve battalions, located in Bobruisk. Bagration expected for answer on his request for deviation of 2nd Western Army through Slonym, Nesvij to Minsk. At 20 pm on 16 June he has received the instruction from Barclay de Tolly on 15 June, in which military minister informed, that the order is given to Platov to begin deviation through Lyda, Smorgon to Swentsam, acting whenever possible in rear and flank of the opponent. Bagration was ordered to prevent cutting off of the 2nd Western army on a road through Minsk to Borysov, and to preserve the right wing of army against a sudden attack. The Instruction of Barclay de Tolly dated 15 June, as well as his instructions received by Bagration earlier, did not bring in clearness to a task of 2nd Western army, and main - did not give the answer to the request of Bagration about deviation to Minsk. Considering further stay of army in area Volkovysk extremely dangerous, Bagration has decided to allocate the army in the specified direction under the own initiative. On 16 June the order on deviation was given up. In these conditions the decision of Bagration can be considered as the best, as only fast deviation of the 2nd Western army to Minsk could warn an exit there of enemy armies and ensure the most favorable conditions for connection of 1-st and 2 Western armies. As it is visible from the above mentioned documents, Bagratoion has not at once come to this decision. On the eve of war he was the supporter of anticipatory actions. Aspiring to relieve the country of threat of enemy invasion, he offered to put the first impacts on an enemy and by that to break all its plans. This idea Bagration very clearly has expressed in plan of campaign of 1812, and also in representations to military minister and Czar. Bagration's offers were quite real during preparations of Napoleon of war against Russia. However in the beginning of June, 1812, when the French army was already made for drawing impact, and Russian army was not prepared for conducting anticipatory actions, these offers did not correspond any more to conditions and were erroneous. But it is necessary to blame for a mistake not Bagration, and the imperial government, which did not inform the commander-in-chief by 2 Western army on conditions. In his judgements Bagration was compelled to consider only own information, which, naturally, could not reflect the true situation that has been occurred on all theatre of military actions. To honour of Bagration it is necessary to mantion, that he managed in time to refuse these sights. During the first days of war he has solved Napoleon's plan and in the report to Barclay de Tolly dated 14 June, put a question not about offensive actions, but about the deviation of 2nd Western army with a task to remove it from under threat of an surrounding and destruction by superior forces of the opponent and by that to break a plan of Napoleon. Bagration has carried out this task perfectly. Unfortunately, some historians do not take into account the inscribed evolution in sights of Bagration and represent him as a commander, who during the Great Patriotic War of 1812 obstinately kept offensive tactics and ostensibly did not want to hear about deviation. Such sight does not correspond to the validity and also belittles Bagration as the commander, who used in the practice such ways of actions that perfectly corresponded to those conditions. The Deviation of 2nd Western army began on 17 June. The army moved in a direction Zelva, Slonym, being covered by two rear guards-horse and infantry. Horse rear guard, consisting from Akhtyrsk Hussar, Lithuanian Uhlan and one Cossacks with horse-artillery, was under leadership ofi general-aide-de-camp Vasylchykov. Infantry rear guard was composed of Grenadier Divsiionm and horse-artillery under general-major Vorontsov. The allocation of two rear guards was caused by necessity to ensure 2nd Army from possible impact of the enemy army from rear. For the purpose to supply army with the foodstuffs during a march, every regiment choosed a group of soldiers led by the skilled officer. These gropus, following ahead of the columns, during rests, provided the foodstuffs at the expense of local means raised by requisitions. Bagration demanded, that performance of the specified task must take place without violence against the peace inhabitants and their robbery. The 2nd Western army had to accomplish a difficult task. They had to overcome distance in 250 miles, while the opponent who has occupied Vilno on 16 June, was only in 160 miles from Minsk. Despite of it, the specified task was quite real, and Bagration was sure in its successful performance. "I calculated marches in the way, that on June 23 my apartment should be in Minsk, avant guarde further, and parties already nbear Sventsyan" -wrote Bagration to A.P. Ermolov. It was the exact and correct account. It provided the most expedient way of connection of 1-st and 2nd Western armies. But the well-organized deviation of 2 nd Western army was broken by intervention in actions of Bagration by Alexander. At 14 pm on 18 June in Zelva the aide-de-camp of Czar, colonel Benkerdorf has handed to Bagration Alexander's order, according to which direction deviation was changed. Bagration was ordered to allocate army near river Shara and to set it on connection with the 1 st Western army through Novogrudok or Belitsy in a general direction on Vileyko. Thus, 2nd Western army should make difficult and dangerous flank march near to the main forces of enemy army, which already were ar this time at Vilno. The complexity of this flank movement was, that the 2nd armys had to make 10 transitions at a distance on 4-5 transitions from the opponent. Besides Russian armies were compelled to move in remote, marshy territory and to make a ferry through a large river barrier - river Neman. All this inevitably would result in a delay of a march, and the army of Bagration could appear under impact of the main enemy forces from front and armies of Jerome Bonaparte - from rear. Obliged to obey the order of Czar, Bagration has begun organization of a march in a new direction. First of all he had to choose one of two specified in Czar's order directions. The way on Bileyko through Belitsy was shorter and convenient but it passed too close from Vilno, and consequently, was also more dangerous. Bagration has selected the second way - through Novogrudok. Though this way also passed on remote and marshy territory, distinguished by a bad condition of roads, but it was far from Vilno and reduced probability of meeting with the opponent. Besides at movement through Novogrudok, which was closer to Minsk, it was easier to strengthen army by connection 27-th infantry division, that reached at this time Minsk. Having accepted the decision on a direction of movement of army, Bagration has given back the following orders: a. to 27th infantry division - to concentrate in Novogrudok and to expect arrival there of main forces of 2 Western army; b. To the chief of the engineers - to send sappers to Neman with a task to make investigation of the river at Kryvichy, Nikolaev and Delyatichy and to construct by June 21 a ferry in the elected place; c. To make recognition of a way for movement of armies on Vishnev and Volojin. The order about the instruction of movement in a new direction was given that very day. Army had to recede by two echelons on distance about one transition one from another, being covered by horse and infantry rear gueard. The special attention was paid on necessity of understanding by all personal structure of an essence an objective, for what Bagration has ordered to explain all details to the sorldielrs the reason and purpose of deviation. Moving in a new direction, 2nd Western army has concentrated at Slonym to the outcome of June 19. On another day it has made the 40-kilometer forced transition and has reached Dvorets. With the purpose of acceleration of a march, army was released from excessive cargoes. All transports, not stipulated by staff, was directed from Dvorets to Stvolytchy and Nesvij for the further following on Minsk or Bobruisk. On June 21 the 2 nd Western army continued movement and, having made again the forced transition for 40 kilometers, has arrived in area Novogrudok. Its advanced parts have reached Delyatichy on Neman, forwarded through the river, have entered Nikolaev and Ivye, having put forward some groups to north. In Novogrudok 27th infantry division joined the army. March of 2nd Western army from Volkovysk up to Novogrudok was accomplished with an extreme speed. Starting on June, 17 from Volkovysk, the army has reached Neman in five transitions, that means it has passed 150 kilometers for 5 day. An Average rate of a march per day was about 30 kilometers, but in last two day the army promoted with speed of 40 kilometers per day. After an way out to Neman organization of a ferry have begun at once. At Nikolaev erection of a bridge was began and the device of the ferry of army, and at Koledzan -construction of the bridge for a ferry of transports. In the meantime to the north from Nikolaev on ways of the further movement of 2-nd Western army there was menacing conditions. On June, 16 the napoleonic army has occupied Vilno. Russian 1st Western army, not accepting battle, started deviation on direction to Sventsyan and Dryss. It meant, that calculation of Napoleon on defeat of Russian armies in area Vilno has failed. Having convinced in impossibility to crush 1st Western army in a frontier strip, Napoleon has decided to concentrate all efforts of the armies against 2nd Western army as it was provided by his plan. To define a direction of deviation of 2-nd Western army, Napoleon has put forward on the major roads departing from Vilno on the south and a southeast, strong avant guardes. On June, 17 one of these avant guardes, moving to the south from Vilno, has found out at Bolshye Solechniky Russian group of general-major Dorokhov. This group was an avant guarde of 4-th infantry division of the 1 st Western army and moved from Oran in a northeast direction on connection with the main forces. This very day other avant guarde of the French army acting to a southeast from Vilno, has received data on an arrangement of Russian armies in area Oshmjany. These armies were parts of lateral guard of the 3rd cavarly corp of the 1-st Western army departing on to Olshan and Smorgon. On June, 18 at Bolshye Solechniky there was a fight, as a result of which Russians have rejected french avant guard. However, getting informed that enemy forces were located to the north, Dorokhov was forced to direct his group to Olshan. He hoped to lay way in this direction and join the main forces of the 4th infantry corpus. Simultaneously, near Olshan, battle between the french avant guarde and flank guard of the 3 rd cavarly corpus took place. Russians firmly rejected all the assauklts of the considerably superior forces of enemy, and thus ensured deviation to Smorgon of the main forces. Succesfully achieving set forth objective, they went back from Oshmian folloing the main forces of the coprpus on the night of 19 June. Having received reports cioncernung the appearance of the Rusian forces on the ways to Lidu and Oshmian and battles, that had been fought at the Bolshix solechnikov and Oshmian, Napoleon supposed that these forces were the part of 2 nd Western Army and that abovesaid armywas moving from Grodno to the north-east, to join the 1st Western Army. Based on this incorrect assessment of situation, he decided to make a decisive assaut on the army of Bagration and destroy it. With a view to fullfill this objective accoriding to te roder of Napoleon, a group of division was deployed, being led by one of the most talanted military commander of the French Army Davout. This detachment was composed of 2 infantry and 1 curaisser divisions and 4 brigades of light cavalry - totally 33, 864 men. Davout's forces began offensive on 19 June. This operation led to the ciurcumstances in which russian forces deployed to the south and south-eat from Vilno, were cut from the main routs, that allowed them to join 1st Western Army in a short period of time. First of all this refered to the Cossacks of Platov and Dorokhov's group. Dorokhov's group retreated from the Bolshie Colechniki to Olshan, and getting informed about the forwarding of the enemy forces to the Oshmian, gave up of the idea to join 1 st Qwestern army . He moved to join 2 nd western army by the road to Bishnev-Volojin on the night of 20 of June. Cossacks of Platov , having left Grodno on 16 of june, retreated to the eatern direction and by 21 June reached the locateion the north from Nikolaev. By the time these events were taking lace, the 2nd Western Army was preparing to cross over the Neman. According to the Bagration's order, the army was to concentrate on the left shore of the river by the 10 pm of 22 June and be ready to cross the river. With the purpose of the further clearing armies of excessive transports, soldiers were authorized to take only the most necessary vehicles (for wounded, artillery, food) and besides in a strictly limited quantity. Generals might have only one carrier, and commanders of divisions and corps, besides - one vehicle under chancellory. All other transport, including the private vehicles belonging to an officers, was concentrated at Korelichi, where it should be divided into two parts; it was planned that one part of it will be forwarded through Neman at Koledzani, with a view of sending them further to Ivenec, Rakov and Minks, while another part - to direct on the Mir and, Minsk. After a ferry, a rest for armies of 2-nd Western army was predetermined, and with approach of darkness - the beginning of a march two columns was provided. Peter Bagration Hero of the Great Pariotic War 1812 (II) The first column in structure of 28 battalions, 8 escadrons, 72 infantry and 24 mounted canons and of sappers has received a task to move from Nikolaev on Vishnev. The chief of a column was the commander of 7-th infantry corpus general-lieutenant Raevsky. The second column in structure 21 battalions, 20 escadrons, 72 infantry and 12 horse artillery and one cossacks shelf should move from Nikolaev on Volojin. The chief of a column was the commander of 8-th infantry corpus general-lieutenant Borozdin. For every column special avant guardes were allocated. Avant guarde of the first column made Novorossisk and Chernigov Dragoon Shelfs, and avant guarde of the second column - Akhtir hussar and one cossack shelfs. Rear guard was composed of the Vasil'chikov's cavalry group strengthened by the Narva infantry and 6-th jager shelfs. However the decision to direct army in two columns on two roads Bagration did not count as a final. On conditions he assumed to set army in one column through Bakshti to Volojin. In the morning of June, 22 the 2nd Western army have started a ferry through Neman at Nikolaev. To outcome of day it was possible to forward only a part of the second column. Other armies should finish a ferry on June, 23, in the early morning. In the evening of June, 22 to Nikolaev has arrived Bagration with the staff. Here he has received the report from Dorokhov (from Volojin) with the message, that his group which has been cut off from 1-st Western army and pursued by the opponent, was moving on connection to 2-nd Western army. Dorokhov asked instructions from Bagration. Also, an official report from Platov has arrived, that informed about the fights with the opponent, carried out by cossacks in the evening of June, 21 and in the morning of June, 22 to the south of Vishnev, and also about a concentration in Vishnev of a large forces of enemy armies. From the analysis of both reports, Bagration made a completely correct conclusion that the opponent already leaves for a way of movement of 2-nd Western army has drawn. Now was necessary for army to make not the extremely dangerous flank march army, but to cut its the way through armies of the opponent. Despite of these unprofitable developing conditions, Bagration has decided to continue realization of a task in view. With this purpose he asked Platov to hold down the opponent in area of Vishnev and be ready to strike together with the 2-nd Western army in rear to the enemy, to break it and to provide an opportunity of connection with 1-st Western army. Bagration has ordered to the group of Dorokhov to keep as long as possible Volojin andonly as a last resort to depart on Kaidanov. Simultaneously Bagration has made some changes in accepted on June, 21 the marching order of 2-nd Western army. By the order given late at night June, 22, Bagration has established the following marching order. The army concentrates at Bakshti on June, 23 in readiness to begin movement by one column on Volojin. The avand guarde of the army was led by the General-adjutant Vasilchikov and was composed of the Akhtir hussar regiment and one cossack shelf, Grenader duivision, Narva infantry and 5th jager regiments and mounted artillery unit. Totally there were 12 battalions, 8 ecadrons, 12 horse artillery and one cossack shelve. The main forces should move in two echelons. The first echelon was consisted of 7-th infantry corpus made, the Second echelon - 8-th infantry corpus. Bagration has ordered to have one sapper unit in the head of every column for correction of roads and bridges. The rear guard was composed of 4-th cavalry corpus. It was offered to all parts to go probably wider front on a case of a sudden meeting with the opponent, and a transport still to reduce, having left in Nikolaev all food and medical vehicles and all crews under covering of one battalion of an escort of the main apartment and one cossack shelf. With a view of maintenance of confidence of march, Bagration has ordered to not plant big fires on camps. Making of this decision, Bagration well understood those improbable difficulties with which it was necessary to meet to his army. Later in the official report he wrote to Alexander: "the review for roads and the sites leading from Nikolaev to Vishnev and Volojin through woods and bogs, rather inconvenient for a fast course of army, and a high level of water in Neman due to strong rain, that has complicated very much my ferry, represented me already a great difficulties to transition of space, occupied by the enemy armies". Therefore, probably, already then he disbelieved in success of the outlined plan of actions, but nevertheless, carrying out a will of king, hoped to break with the armies from Nikolaev on connection with 1-st Western army. However in night for June, 23 Bagration has received disturbing news about transition in approach of armies of the right wing of French armies and their output to Slonim from the side of Volkovysk, and also to Lipshniki on the part of Grodno. This circumstance has made to conditions an essential change. Earlier, when armies of the right wing of napoleonic army stayed idle, the 2nd Western army might make a march on Vileyko, not being afraid for the rear. Now, when the opponent goes over to the offensive on a right wing of the front, a real threat to rear to 2-nd Western army was created, and it was necessary to consider with this threat. Having attentively estimated the new conditions, Bagration has understood, that even if the 2nd Western army manages to overturn army of Davout and to break on connection with the 1st Western army, it would lose a lot of people, would lose all transports with military property and would appear so weakened, that after connection would not bring some essential advantage to the common interest. In a case of failure of break it would appear in disastrous position as on ways of its deviation, there were armies of the right wing of napoleonic army. All these circumstances have forced Bagration to give up from performing the direction of movement of the 2nd Western army outlined in advance by Tsar Alexander I, then to turn army in a new direction and by that to leave from under covering impact of napoleonic armies. Bagration has decided to recede on Nesvij, and therefrom to be set either to Minsk, or to Bobruisk, Borisov, in order to aspire to connection with the 1 st Western army by this way. "This decision is regrettable , - wrote Bagration from Nikolaev to Platov, - but it as much is necessary" . In the morning of June, 23 under order of Bagration the ferry through Neman was stopped, and armies of the 2nd Western army have started movement in direction Delatichi, Negnevichi, Korelichi. Movement of army was made in the following marching order. In the head of army there was an avant guarde in structure of Narva infantry, 5th jager, Akhtir hussar, Lithuanian Ulan, Kief Dragoon regiments, monuntd arttilery unit and three cossack sheklfs. In total in avant guarde there were 4 infantry battalions, 20 escadrons, 12 horse artillery and 3 shelf of cossacks. General-aide-de-camp Vasil'chikov led the avant guarde. Behind avant guarde the main forces, the 7th and 8th infantry corps moved. Both corps followed independent marching columns. Before every column moved on one unit of sappers. Marche of army was guarded from the rear by two rear guards (infantry and cavalry). An Infantry rear guard, following closer to the main forces, was composed of Summary grenadierial division of Vorontsov with a unit of mounted artillery (totally 8 battalions and 12 horse artillery). Cavalry rear guard under command of general-major Sivers consisted from Kharkov, Chernigov and Novorossysk Dragoon Regiments, 6 Cossak shelfs and unit of mounted artillery (totally 12 squadrons, 12 horse artillery and 6 cossack shelfs). Having made the decision on deviation of 2nd Western army from Nikolaev and its movement in a new direction, Bagration has informed Platov about it. He offered the last which was not formally subordinated to him, "by detaining the enemy to not submit even the slightest kinds of information about our deviation ". The corpus of cossacks, having stood on 23 and June, 24, might in night for June, 25 to recede to Nikolaev. "After that," - wrote Bagration - "...We shall search together means to reach incorporation with 1st army. It is the only way which however gives us time to incorporate and to not lose much ". Waiting for the answer from Platov, Bagration remained in Nikolaev till 16 pm of 23 June. Not having received to this term of the answer, he has sent to Platov the second letter in which, again having confirmed the offer stated in the previous letter, asked Platov to notify on the decision. " If I remain here still now, it is only infor waiting, on what you were solved ". At the same time Bagration specified, that the ferries induced by his army at Nikolaev and Koledzani, will remain not destroyed and be under covering of small groups till midday of June, 24 and then will be subjected to destruction. Simultaneously with letters to Platov, Bagration send order to Dorokhov to recede with the group to Stolbtsi for the connection with the 2nd Western army at Novy Swerjen. To evening of June, 23 the 2nd Western army reached Korelichi. Taking into account urgent necessity to arrive to Minsk as soon as possibly and to anticipate an output there the opponent, Bagration has issued in Korelichi the special order on acceleration of a march. He demanded of commanders of divisions, corps and regiments to use everything that during a march to not exhaust and keep an army. The same marching order with what armies went from Nikolaev up to Korelichi was established. It was ordered avant guarde to step at 7, the 7 th infantry corpus - at 8, the 8th infantry corpus - at 9, and rear guard - after one hour after performance of 8-th corpus. Having covered 5 miles from a place of a lodging for the night, armies should have a rest for 1 hour, after 10 miles - for 2 hours, after 15 miles - for 3 hours and etc. On halts it was ordered to soldiers to not rise before anybody, except for king if at last he has arrived to army. The signal "field-marshal" was cancelled. ("a signal of field-marshal" - drumbeat on which for half an hour or hour prior to the beginning of a campaign of an army rose from a camp and prepared for performance). According to the order the 2 nd Western army has acted in a direction to Mir in the morning of June, 24 and concentrated there at the outcome of the same day. Bagration remained in Korelichi till 20 pm, waiting for news from Platov and Dorokhov. Soon official report of Platov was received, in which Platov stated that according to instructions of Bagration, he will direct cossacks on 24 June from Baksht to Nikolaev and for night for June, 25 will make a ferry through Neman. Platov informed also, that for acceptance from the 2nd Western army of a ferry and its maintenancein appropriate readiness, he has sent to Nikolaev command led by captain Tarasov. Special interest of Bagration was caused a message of general-major Dorokhov (sent with Platov's report) about the deviation of the opponent from Volojin. Having received this news, Bagration has made the assumption, that Davout, being sure that 2nd Western army will cross the river at Nikolaev, has decided to concentrate all forces at Vishnev in order to prevent movement of Russian armies in northern direction. Proceeding from this assumption, Bagration made a conclusion on an opportunity to reach connection with 1st Western army by movement of 2 nd Western army in a direction on Novy Swerjen, Maidanov Minsk. In these circumstances, employment by Russian armies of Volojin might detain for some days progress of enemy armies on road to Minsk. On June, 24 Bagration has directed to Platov a letter in which has offered him to borrow Volojin together with a group of general-major Dorokhov and to apply all forces on keeping this important point at least till June, 26. With the purpose to distract attention of the opponent from Volojin, Bagration advised Platov to send on the part of Nikolaev and Baksht strong groups to Vishnev and thus to force the enemy to think of approach Russians from Nikolaev. Bagration notified Platov, that actions of his army on Vishnev will be maintained by three Dragoon shelfs under command of general-major Sivers, and in the meantime the main forces of the 2 nd Western army, moving the forced marches, will be forwarded through Neman in Novy Swerjen and on June, 25 will be in Kaidanov, that is all in 40 miles from Minsk and consequently, will anticipate an output there the armies of Davout. In the instruction it was emphasized, that movement of the 2nd Western army on Maidanov by all means demands employment of Volojin by Cossacks and Dorokhov's group, and it was specified, that these armies after achievement by the main forces of Kajdanov will be supported by two units of Cossacks, allocated from the 2nd Western army. However this plan was not carried out. Owing to almost complete absence of roads, corpus of Platov could not to move to Volojin. Examination of the location by cossacks has established occurrence on this way of infantry of the opponent. Platov has decided, having directed a brigade of general-major Kutejnikov with five hundreds soldiers of Ataman Regiment on the help to Dorokhov's group, to allocate other forces of the corpus to Nikolaev and therefrom to be set on Stolbtsi and Kaylanov, that is on the same direction on which the movement of the 2nd Western army planned. The decision of Platov has disturbed Bagration. However he has not left the idea and still hoped to anticipate the opponent in Minsk. On June, 24 Bagration has directed to Platov a new letter with the request to forward the corpus entrusted to him through Neman in area of Koledzany, then to incorporate to group of Dorokhov and to follow on Ivenets, Rakov and Radoshkevichio. In this case, specified Bagration, cossacks, covering all roads to Minsk from the enemy, may render essential assistance to 2 nd Western army and together with it successfully arrive to Minsk. After moving from Karelichy, Bagration has directed to Platov one more letter in which has again repeated the request. He wrote: " I kindly request to give ways to Mr. Dorokhov to incorporate to you and that you, having complied with my offer, followed the path offered to your excellency, covering roads Minsk from the enemy. You, making the march favourable and covering following of 2-nd army to Minsk, it is easy perhaps, will cut off the enemy groups sent on road to Minsk... ". However Platov's attempt to be set in accordance with directives specified by Bagration also has not crowned success. Before the outcome of June, 24, Cossacks reflected several attempts of the opponent to make the way from Vishnev to Bakshta and to Nikolaev. In night for June, 25 the corpus was forwarded through Neman at Nikolaev and, having destroyed the bridge and ferries, was set on Deliatichi, Lubchu, Koledzan, intending there to be forwarded again through Neman. To the moment of an exit of Platov to Koledzan the ferry induced there by the 2nd Western army and protected till midday June, 24, was destroyed. Attempt of Platov's corpus to pass Neman .... appeared impossible. It has forced Platov to refuse from offered by Bagration ways of movement. He has turned to Karelichi and was set after the 2nd Western army. With a deviation of the 2 nd Western army from Nikolaev, Napoleon's plan to put Russian army under double impact of armies of Davout and Jerome, that in the subsequent to surround it and tototally destroy, suffered a failure. This plan was broken due to that the commander-in-chief of the 2nd Western army General Bagration has managed to solve timely a plan of the enemy and to deviate the army from under impact. Failure of plans of Napoleon was promoted substantially by a divergence of the commander right-flank column of the napoleonic army Jerome Bonaparte, who, having occupied on June, 17 Grodno, has not organized immediate pursuance of the 2nd Western army. He was late in Grodno for the whole five day, engaged with pulling up of the armies and expecting instructions from Napoleon. All this has allowed army of Bagration to recede up to the Nikolaev at absence of influence on the part of the opponent. Having learned about a failure of the plan to destroy the 2nd Western army by drawing on it of a double impact by forces of armies of Davout and Jerome, Napoleon has come in strong fury. All fault for a failure of this plan he assigned to the brother, seeing in actions of the last one of principal causes which have not allowed him to achieve route of 2nd army. Even right at the beginning of realization of the plan Napoleon, coordinating actions of armies of Davout and Jeromea, complained that badly conducts investigation and does not inform him on conditions. He wrote to the brother: "Your courier sent yesterday at four o'clock in the evening from Grodno, arrives to me. Its arrival was extremely pleasant for me, as I hoped, that you have sent to the chief of a staff of army new datas on Bagration's army, on a direction given by you to Ponjatovsky's corpus, and on movements on Volynia. What my surprise was, when I have learned, that the chief of a staff of army has received from you only complaints to one of generals. I can express you only the displeasure for that small quantity of data on the opponent which I receive from you. I do not know neither the amount of divisions of Bagrations, nor their numbers, a place where there was the last (Bagration); also, neither those datas which were received by you in Grodno, nor what did you do. I do not admit idea that you have so badly executed your duty that do not pursue the opponent the very next day. I hope at least, that prince Ponjatovsky conducts prosecution with all his corpus". The especial irritation of Napoleon has caused news that all his worst assumptions have proved to be true and that Jerome has not organized prosecution of army of Bagration. Napoleon has ordered to the chief of a staff marshal Bertie to direct to Jerome a letter with expression of extreme discontent by actions of the last. In the letter it was spoken: "Inform the king of Westphalia about my extreme displeasure on him for he has not directed all armies under command of prince Ponjatovskogo for prosecution of Bagration to detain army of the last and to stop its movement... Inform him, that to direct an operation worse, than he conducted it - is impossible... Tell him, that the result of all my movements and optimum of cases ever representing on war - is missed owing to the mentioned exclusive oblivion by him of the basic concepts of military science ". Reproaches of Napoleon have worked on Jerome and force him to start movement from Grodno. But time was already missed, and about the coordinated impact might not be speeches. However Napoleon has not refused the plan. Aspiring by all means to cut off ways of deviation of the 2nd army and to put it under double impact, he has thrown armies of Davout to Minsk with a task to anticipate an exit there of the 2nd Western army, while has ordered to army of Jerome to pursue persistently Russian army. On June, 25 Bagration has received news about promotion of armies of Davout to Minsk and occupation by them of Rakov. Simultaneously he has learned about the approach to Novogrudok of an advanced parts of the right wing of napoleonic army. Having attentively estimated conditions, Bagration has understood, that 2-nd Western army will not manage to anticipate the opponent in Minsk. Hence, in case of movement to Minsk it should enter battle with armies of Davout at simultaneous action against it of the army of Jerome from rear. Bagration was compelled to refuse the planned march to Minsk and again to change a direction for deviation of army. He has decided to turn army to Bobruisk through Nesvij and Slutsk. It was the correct and unique decision in those conditions. It rescueed 2-nd Western army from double impact of superior forces of the enemy, threat of an surrounding and inevitable route. On June, 25 under order of Bagration all transports were sent to Nesvij as well as 8-th infantry regiment. Other divisions of the 2-nd Western army under personal command of Bagration were directed to Novy Swerjen to accept a group of Dorokhov, that was receding there. In the evening in Novy Swerjen, Dorokhov's group has incorporated to the 2-nd Western army and arrived together with it to Nesvij next day. Thus, to outcome of June, 26 all divisions of the 2-nd Western army concentrated in Nesvij. Taking into account strong fatigue of the armies exhausted by continuous marches within 10 day, without rests, Bagration has decided to give army a rest. Active preparation of armies for new, not less difficult and complex march was simultaneously conducted. Right at the beginning of realization of his decision, Bagration again faced intervention in his actions of the king, trying to order instructions for the 2-nd Western army without a knowledge and the account of that concrete conditions in which it was necessary to operate. On 25 June when Bagration with the main forces of the army was in Novy Swerjen, aide-de-camp of Tsar Benkendorf has arrived with an order about the necessity for the 2 nd Western army to move to Minsk. The same task was put to carry out which Bagration tried in the beginning of war but which was cancelled by the instruction of king received in Zelva. But if then, in the beginning of war when the opponent was still in Vilno, realization of this task was possible, now when the group of armies of Davout already approached to Minsk, and from rear there came group of Jerome Bonaparte, performance of this instruction was impossible. Moreover, in case of attempt of its performance the 2nd Western army might come to be in disastrous position for itself on. Deeply understanding the responsibility for destiny of the army entrusted to him, Bagration might not execute an order of Tsar and has decided to carry out the planned plan. He has sent Alexander the letter in which informed, that the 2nd Western army has already changed a direction of the movement, intending to make a march through Nesvij and Slutsk to Bobruisk. This decision testifies to the huge courage of Bagration, who have not afraid to go contrary to will of Tsar in interests of army. So, the 2 nd Western the army has settled down in Nesvij and prepared for a march to Bobruisk. Platov's Cossacks departed on the south from Nikolaev and according to the decision of the main command passed in direct submission of Bagration. The order on it was handed by Benkendorf to Bagration in Novy Swerjen. All this considerably facilitated position of the 2nd army, as a threat of route of it parts was eliminated. Having notified Platov about transition of cossacks in the submission, Bagration has ordered to him to depart on Novogrudok, Stvolichi and Snov to cover thus a concentration of army in Nesvij and then to follow to Nesvij and serve as an rear guard of the 2nd army. Platov has received Bagration's order in night for June, 26 when his armies already approached to the Mir, and Novogrudok was already in hands of the opponent. With a view of maintenance Nesvij from the west, he has sent in polonechki and Snov three units of Cossacks with an aggregate number in 1500 persons under command of general-major Karpov. Platov has informed Bagration about the accepted decision. The last, having approved this decision, has ordered Platov to pay special attention to necessity to keep Mir. Only in case of the significant superiority of enemy forces Platov was authorized to recede to Nesvij. Deduction of Mir might provide to the main forces of 2-nd Western army an opportunity to have a rest. Having received order about the necessity to keep Mir, Platov has begun its performance. He has decided to apply favourite tactical disposition, the so-called "Venter". The essence of this methode was to entice the opponent in an ambush, and then to strike on him from different directions, to surround and destroy. By June, 27 near Mir, at direct order of Platov there were several units of cossacks and unit of the mounted artillery. He has put one unit of cossacks in Mir, and others were deployed to the south from Mir in a grove Jablonovshina. Ahead of Mir on road to Karelichi 100 cossacks were put forward. Twi hundred cossacks were placed on both sides of road in the latent places in an ambush. In the early morning June, 27 in a direction on Mir, the brigade under command of the general Turne from the 4-th division of light cavalry of the 4-th cavalry corpus has gone over to the offensive. Ahead came 3rd Uhlan Brigade, and after it - other forces of a brigade - 15-th and 16-th Divisions. All three squadrons of the 3rd Uhlan Brigade moved on road to Mir one after another. When gone ahead squadron has approached to Cossacks, the last began to depart quickly to Mir. The opponent began to pursue Cossacks and has rushed in pursuance in Mir. On southern surburb location Cossacks together with another Cossack Regiment has passed in approach and has pushed aside the opponent. The enemy was overturned and has addressed in chaotic flight. At this time hundreds of cossacks strike on the enemy from flanks and from front. The 3-rd Uhlan Brigade was surrounded and almost completely destroyed. Only to the rests of the brigade was possible to break from an ambush. To the aid of the 3 rd Bridgade, general Turne directed three Uhlan squadrons. However arrival of fresh forces has not rescued position. The opponent again was overturned by vigorous attack and run in a panic. In fight under Mir June, 27 on the part of Russian operated about 4 thousand persons, and on the part of the French - over 2 thousand persons. The French have lost 8 officers and 348 private soldiers killed, wounded and in a captivity. Russian lost 25 persons killed and wounded. Having found out about route by 2-nd Uhlan brigades under Mir, the French command has set other forces of 4-th division of light cavalry against squadrons of Platov. From his part, Bagration, having received official report from Platov about the carried out fight, has ordered to the last to continue keeping the opponent at Mir. On strengthening of Platov, he has directed group under command Vasilchikov in structure of three cavalry units. Next day Platov has decided to repeat tactical disposition which has excellently managed in fight of June, 27. With this purpose he has ordered to rear guard (three regiments of cossacks) to entice the opponent on road from Mir to the south, and to the main forces located to south-west from Simkovo and has set the task to put to the opponent impact in flank. Besides he has sent the order to brigade of Kuteynikov which, moving after group of Dorokhov, has reached to this time Stolbtsi, to move immediately to Simkovo, in order to take part together with main forces in a surrounding and destruction of enemy armies. However the opponent considered lessons of fight of June, 27 and, being afraid of an ambush, showed care. After Russian rear guard, the French command directed only 7-th Regiment of 1-st Brigade, while other forces of 4-th division of light cavalry has stopped at Simakov, (the 2-nd brigade settled down on southwest surburb of a village, and 2nd and 11-th regiments of the 1-st brigade - on northern.) In these conditions Platov has changed an initial plan, having decided to crush the enemy by courageous and vigorous impact. Under his order at 13 pm parts of the former rear guard in a structure of one Cossavck, Akhtyrsk hussar, Kiev Dragoon and 2-nd Don Horse-battery unit attacked 7-th Uhlan Regiment and have rejected it to Simakov. Simultaneously main forces of Cossacks attacked 2-nd Uhlan brigade. Approach of Russian forces at once has created threat of cutting of the left flank of the French armies. The French command has put forward to the aid of 7-the Regiment, a squadron of 2-nd Uhlan Brigade which till that was in a reserve. Besides it has developed more to the left of road 11-th Uhlan regiment and one Squadron of the 16-th Uhlan Regiment. The 2-nd Uhlan Regiment without squadron (that was settled down to the north from Simakov), continued to remain in a reserve. By these actions, the French command managed to liquidate threat of cutting of the left flank of its army. At the front attacks of the main forces of Platov, the French also showed fierce resistance. Persistent fight proceeded within six hours. From both parties it was conducted with an exclusive pressure, but to any of them did not give overweight. At 21 pm Kuteynikov Brigade has approached to a battlefield, having made from Stolbtsy the forced march. Having developed between villages Podlesye and Ozersk, the brigade directly has entered into fight, suddenly having attacked the opponent from the left flank and rear. Simultaneously main forces of Cossacks have struck from front and the right flank. The opponent has not sustained the coordinated impact and has addressed in chaotic flight. Cossacks vigorously pursue it. During operations under Mir on June, 28 Belorussian peasant Denis, the inhabitant of village Simakovo was distinguished. He was sent together with a group of cossacks in Stolbtsy that to lead therefrom to a place of fight a brigade of Kuteynikov. Denis has carried out this task exemplary. He has lead a brigade on shortest way well known to him, and thus promoted duly its input in fight. In fights of 27 and 28 June under Mir the army of Platov have crushed 9 enemy units. It was the first victory of Russian armies during the Great Patriotic war of 1812. This victory has installed in Russian army a confidence of the its forces and, having detained the opponent at Mir, allowed to 2-nd Western army to have a rest in Nesvij and to be prepared for the further movement to Bobruisk. The 2 nd Western army began march from Bobruisk on June, 28. The main forces of army moved on two echelons. In the first echelon there was 8-th infantry Regiment, and in the second - 7-th infantry Regiment. The first echelon has acted from Nesvij at 18 pm on June, 28, and the second - in the morning of June, 29. Making a march in such order, the main forces of 2-nd Western army arrived to Tymkovichy at the evening of June, 29, where Bagration received through aide -de camp Volkonskly Czar's new instructions. Alexander I wrote to Bagration, that movement of 2-nd Western army to Bobruisk was extremely harmful, and insisted on necessity of movement to Minsk. " I do hope, that after reception of my commands . . . . . you shall again address on a former direction. . . " -- was written in an instruction. Alexander's instructions did not correspond to conditions at all. Therefore Bagration might not change already begun movement of armies. Having explained in details the heavy position in which there was 2nd Western army, Bagration has informed Alexander that the army will continue movement to Bobruisk and that the only extreme situation, compelled it to move in this direction. The 2nd Western army continued a march. On June, 30 it has achieved Romanov, and on July, 1 - Slutsk. March of army was reliably covered from rear by the rear guard, which was made still with corps of Platov strengthened with group Vasilchykov. Taking into account the circumstance, that avant guards of the opponent have entered into direct contact with his rear guards, Bagration has taken additional measures on amplification of the last. He has supported it by the Grenadier division of Vorontsov. Within June, 29 Platov's rear guard stood to the south from Mir in readiness to repulse new approach of the enemy, providing thus a march of 2 nd Western army. In the evening of June, 29, carried out of the task, it began a withdrawal after army and to night for June, 30 has arrived in Nesvij. In the morning June, 30 Platov has ordered to the Grenadier Division to act on Timkovichy and then to follow to Romanov. The division should be all time for a half of distance between army and cossacks. The group the general-aide-de-camp Vasilchykov was ordered to followi the Grenadier division, being between to it abd cossacks. In night for July, 1, Platov with ten cossacks regiments,. Lithuanian Uhlan Regiment and Don horse-artillery, having left Nesvij, has followed Vasilchikov. The withdrawal of all these armies was covered by especially allocated rear guard under command of general-major Karpov in structure of two Cossack Regiments. While the 2nd Western army make a march from Nesvij on road to Bobruisk, the French command prepared a new impact against it. It has decided to undertake in a second time an attempt of surrounding and destruction of Bagration. With this purpose army of Davout, which has reached about midday of June, 26 Minsk, were divided into two groups. One group under davout's personal leadership, was ordered to come in a southeast direction, to leave in area of Bobruisk for a way of deviation of 2-nd Western army and together with the army of Jerome Bonaparte, put on it a double impact. In this group there were 29 battalions and 34 squadrons with an aggregate number in 21 thousand soldiers. Another group under command of Grushy (7 battalions and 27 squadrons, with a total number about 9 thousand men) was ordered to go in a northeast direction, to seize Borisov and cutt off the way of 2-nd Western army, in a case if last manage to avoid collision with Davout and go along Berezina or Dnepr to the north on connection with 1-st Western army. Napoleon warned of an opportunity of such change of events Davout by a special letter. "It is seemed to me obvious - Napoleon wrote - that Bagration first of all should make attempt of movement upwards the left coast of Berezina. As soon as he finds out, that you have occupied Borisov and move in this direction, he will try to rise upwards on the right coast of Dnepr and, at last, when will be convinced that it is impossible in an equal measure, he, probably, will proceed Dnepr to go to Smolensk ". Avant guardes of both groups have acted in the specified directions immediately after occupation of Minsk, and in some days after them, the main forces were set also. On a direction of approach of Grushy actually there was not Russian army at all. The only barrier for the opponent was the fortress of Borisov, which defense was organized badly. Construction of strengthenings to the moment of approach of the French armies was not finished. The garrison of city consisted from two units of the sappers, two spare battalions of Jagers and cossacks. The aggregate number of garrison was only 400 persons who were taking place under command of colonel Gressera. There was no field artillery in Borisov at all, only 16 pig-iron siege canons. Having received information on approach to Borisov of an enemy army, colonel Gresser has decided, in a view of obvious insufficiency of his, to leave Borisov, preliminary having destroyed in all foodstuffs, the weapon and an ammunition, and to recede through Mogilyov, Bobruisk on connection with 2-nd Western army. Under the order of colonel Gresser, Russians burnt 1960 quarters of a flour, 183 quarters of groats, 2345 quarters straw and 19500 poods of hay. Besides 100 pounds of gunpowder were flooded in Berezina and 16 canons were destroyed and damaged. The garrison of city has burnt out the bridge through Berezina and at 10 o'clock in the morning on June, 30 has acted from Borisov on road to Mogilyov. This very day advanced parts of group of Grushy have entered the city. Simultaneously with promotion of group Grushy to Borisov, Davout made approach to a southeast from Minsk to Bobruisk. By July, 1 the avant guarde of this group has reached Jegumen, and its inteligence groups have appeared at Svyloch in 40 miles from Bobruisk. Occurrence of the opponent in immediate proximity from Bobruisk again has created menacing conditions for 2-nd Western army which again might appear between two fires - army of Davout from front and army of Jerome from rear. Bagration has learned about these events on July, 1 when the main forces of 2-nd Western army have reached Slutsk. Having estimated conditions, he has decided to force a march of the army to Bobruisk to anticipate opponent's way out there. With a view of acceleration of movement and maintenance of army of an opportunity of more free maneuvering, it was decided to release it from extra transports. According to Bagration's order all vehicles, except for food and an infirmary were directed to Petrikov, in order to to forward there through Pripyat, concentrate in Mozyr and arrive under protection of the reserve corps. For covering transports during their movement to Mozyr the special group under command of vice-colonel Klenovsky was allocated. The group consist of a Grenadier battalion, Slutsk garrison command and a part of cossacks. The big interest is represented with organization by Bagration of marching movement of army. The marching order accepted by him allowed to make the way forward in case of an exit on a way of movement of Russian army of the Davout's forces, and simultaneously to beat off army of Jerome from rear. The 7-th infantry corp with the 27-th infantry division, Novorossyisk and Chernigov Dragoon and Izymsk Hussar Regiments and most part of cossacks has made the first echelon with a task to repulse the attacking enemy and move to Bobruisk. The 8-th infantry corps, rear guard of Platov and the Grenadie division, made the second echelon and were orderedto resist to Jerome Bonaparte's army. All staying at army transports moved between 7-th and 8-th infantry corps, being covered with them both from armies Davout and Jerome. For successful performance of Bagration's decision, it was required, that transports had time to pass on road to Petrikov a sufficient distance and to appear in safe position. Besides it was necessary, that the first echelon has passed distance which would allow movement the transports which have stayed at armies, and other forces of 2-nd Western army. In this situation the important role dropped out on a Platov's rear guard which should restrain the enemy, providing a march of the main forces of army. Bagration has ordered to organize withdrawal of the rear guard with a calculation to not press on army. "If they will leave us in rest for two or three marshes - Bagration wrote to Platov - then I hope, we shall make well business " Bagration assumed to start a march from Slutsk to Bobruisk on July, 2. However owing to a delay with departure of transports to Mozyr, the beginning of march was to postpone for whole day. This circumstance increased in the greater degree a role of Platov's rear guard which should detain approach of the opponent by all means, having provided the main forces of 2-nd Western army an opportunity of unobstructed marching from Slutsk, and to the transports sent on road to Mozyr - a traffic safety in the given direction. In connection with change of conditions an additional order was sent to Platov, in which Bagration demanded to locate corps entrusted to him (Platov) in Romanov and to use all means to detain the opponent till night of July, 3. In night for July, 4 Platov should act to Slutsk and, passing this point, stop on road to Glusk (at a fork to Petrikov) and be there all the day, that is before night. According to received order, Platov settle down the rear guard at Romanov in the following disposition. The 5-th Jager regiment was put in Romanov. Don horse-artillery, divided into two batteries of 6 canons in each, occupied an advantage-ground at river Wusvo (to northeast from Romanov). Platov has arranged main forces on a right shore of Wusva: on right flank, in thrickets of the bush, two cossack regiments under command Ilovayskyt, in the centre - group under command of karpov , and on the left flank, in bushes to the east from Savkovo - brigade Kuteynikov. Cossaclks were put ahead of the main forces. The reserve made Ataman regiment, settled down for the centre and a group of Vasilchikov, to east from Romanov. Platov intended to put defeat to the opponent moving in avant guarde and to reject them from Romanov. In case of approach of superior forces, he assumed to allocate the troops for the river and, having destroyed bridges, to defend this position before night as has ordered Bagration. In the morning July, 3 the avant guard of the right wing of the French army, has gone over to the offensive on Romanov. The 1-st Jager Regiment, being one of the best regiments of the French cavalry, moved ahead,. At approach of the opponent Cossacks, not entering fight, began to depart. Pursuing them, the opponent has approached to Romanov, where was met and attacked by Karpov's forces. The commander of 1-st Jager Regiment has developed 2-nd battalion in a shooting circuit which has fastened firing with cossacks. Having convinced in the superiority of Russian armies, the commander of French regiment has decided to depart, but at this time has received an order with the categorical requirement to attack Platov. It has forced him to start preparation for an attack. He has reconstructed the squadrons and 3rd and 4 th squadrons were put forward. In the meantime Platov, having found out about weakness of the opponent, suddenly has decided to put a strong impact on it. Group of Karpov attacked the enemy from front, and Ilovaysky's Regiment together with Kuteynikov's brigade - from flanks. The opponent was overturned and inverted in flight. Cossacks vigorously pursued him. The 1-st Jager Regiment was completely defeated. The participant of events, Polish general Kolachkovsky, marks in the notes that it was possible to rescue only to the one who had a good horse. "This brilliant regiment - wrote Kolachkovsky - totaling about 700 cavalrymen, has lost half of structure and might not recover during all campaign" When the chief of avant guarde of right wing Latur-Mobur has received the report on this defeat, he has quickly set with all light cavalry to Romanov. Platov's troops have stopped prosecution and went on left coast of Wusva, having settled down in two groups to the north and to the south Romanov. Bridges through the river were burnt. Having came to the river, the opponent has put forward the battery and fastened firing with Russian armies. From both parties a strong artillery fire was conducted, and, it must be mentioned, that six canons of Don arttilery fired at the battery of the opponent, and other six - on an enemy cavalry. The opponent has suffered losses and was compelled to depart back to Romanov. Russians have stood all day at Romanov on 3 July. To evening Platov has received order from Bagration - to leave in Romanov horse rear guard, and to move to Glutsk with other forces, and to arrive there in the morning of 5 July. According to this order in night, Platov began moving on road Slutsk on 4 July. March of 2-nd Western army from Slutsk to Bobruisk was made in very difficult conditions. The sandy road which was taking place on continuous marshland, summer heat and wood fires, rare and underpopulated points, lack of drinking water - all this strongly exhausted staff. But Bagration's army have successfully overcome difficulties of a march. On July, 5 the first echelon of army has arrived to Bobruisk, and on July, 6 also other forces of army have concentrated there. Thus, as a result of skilful organization and speed of realization of a march, the 2nd Western army has anticipated enemy armies on way to Bobruisk. A plan of French command to cut off ways of a withdrawal of the 2nd Western army and to put it under double impact again has failed. On July, 7 in Bobruisk through aide-de-camp Volkonsky, Bagration has received Alexander's instructions on the further actions of 2-nd Western army. According to these instructions the army was ordered to be forwarded through Dnepr, to be set to Smolensk and to anticipate there the French armies. Present conditions extremely complicated performance of a task in view. The matter is that the French command, having lost hope to block Bagration a way of deviation to Bobruisk, has decided to carry out it on Dnepr, at Mogilyov where the only constant ferry through Dnepr was located. According to it, the fast promotion of Davout to Mogilyov has begun and to the moment of reception by Bagration of Czar's instructions, the opponent was on distance of four transitions (85 kms) from Mogilyov, while the 2nd Western army was removed from it on six transitions (120 kms). Hence, if 2nd army has made attempt to make use of a ferry at Mogilyov, it should face the main forces of Davout's army. Construction by army of a ferry through Dnepr to the south of Mogilyov, where there were no constant ferries, would demand a lot of time, and the opponent would receive an opportunity to pass Dnepr and to seize Smolensk prior to Russian army. But there were on other solution of this sutuation, and Bagration has decided to move army through Stary Bikhov to Mogilyov with the purpose either to fight and to break through Mogilyov on connection with 1-st Western army or to use fight in the demonstrative purposes to keep Davout on a right coast of Dnepr, and in the meantime, having secretly forwarded the main forces of army to the south of Mogilyov, to move them to Smolensk. On July, 7 according to the accepted decision, the 2nd Western army have moved from Bobruisk in order to go through Stary Bikhov to Mogilyov. The avant guarde under command of colonel Sysoev in structure of five Cossack Regiments went ahead. After it the avant guarde of active armed forces moved under command of general-aide-de-camp Vasilchikov in structure of Akhtyrsk hussar and Kiev Dragoon Regiments with horse-artillery (totally 12 squadrons and 12 horse artillery). On a march this avant guarde was replaced by a new avant guarde of active armed forces under command of general-major Syvers, (Novorossyisk and Chernigov dragoon Regiments (8 squadrons). The main forces moved in two echelons. The first echelon was made by the 7-th infantry and 4-th cavalry corps and a pioneer unit of vice-colonel Orlov. This echelon had the avant guarde in structure of two Jager Regiments.. In total in the first echelon there were 28 battalions, 16 squadrons, 72 artillery and one pioneer unit. The second echelon was composed of the 8-th infantry corps, 27th infantry division, 1-st and 18-th Jager Regiments and a pioneer unit of captain Zotov. In avant guarde of the second echelon two Jager Regiments moved also. In total in the second echelon there were 28 battalions, 20 squadrons, 72 artillery and one pioneer unit. March was covered by two rear guards. One under command of general-major Vorontsov, consisted of the Summary grenadier division, 5-th Jager Regiment, Kharkov Dragoon Regiment and horse artillery, all from 12 battalions, 4 squadrons and 12 horse artillery. Another rearguard was made by irregular trrops under command of the general-major Karpov - two Cossacks Regiments and Don horse-artillery (12 artillery). Simultaneously with organization of a march to Mogilyov, Bagration has ordered to the chief of engineers to make recognition of Dnepr to the south of Mogilyov with the purpose of construction there the bridge in case the 2-nd Western army would be unable to make the way through Mogilyov. On July, 9 Davout has sent from Mogilyov on road on the south the 3-rd Jager Reguiment with a task to pursue departing group of colonel Gresser. At the same time the avant guarde of the irregular trrops of the 2nd Western Army came nearer to Mogilyov from the south, having ordered to learn about the opponent forces in the city. Having passed Saltanovka, Russian avant guarde has collided with the 3rd Jager Regiment of the opponent. Sysoev has developed the regiments in one line (in the centre there was one regiment, and on flanks - two Cossack regiments) In such fighting order Sysoev amicably attacked the opponent. The regiment, taking place in the centre, has struck from front, and other regiments - from flanks. The opponent does not sustain attack of cossacks and has taken to flight. Cossacks persistently pursued the enemy up to the city. Peter Bagration Hero of the Great Pariotic War 1812 (III) Having met resistance 85-th linear regiment with two canons, that was put forward by Davout to the aid of jagers, Sysoev has suspended prosecution and has departed to Buynichy. During this fight the opponent has suffered from significant losses. Russians have captured 215 men, including the commander of 3-rd Jager Regiment, the colonel of Sen-Mars. Having found out about that Davout have already seized Mogilyov, Bagration has decided to lead forces of 7-th infantry division and attacj enemy in accordance with earlier accepted plan. The purpose of fight was to find out structure of enemy armies in area of Mogilyov and in case if in this area there would be only advanced parts of Davout's army to seize Mogilyov, having provided thus 2-nd Western army a ferry through Dnepr. If in area of Mogilyov there are main forces of Davout, Bagration expected to use attack with the purpose to keep the opponent on a position at Mogilyov, and in the meantime to forward 2-nd Western army through Dnepr to the south of Mogilyov and to set it on a forced march to Smolensk. Bagration persistently demanded from Rayevsky to speed up attacking opponent to prevent its strengthening and simultaneously took vigorous measures on search of a ferry between Mogilyov and Stary Bikhov. Bagration wrote to Rayevsky on July, 11: "If our Lord would give us an opportunity to find a ferry between you and Stary Bikhov, then we shall immediately cross the river". To outcome of July, 10 ( 22 ) Bgagration's troops occupied the following position. 7-th infantry division settle down at Dashkovka, 8-th infantry corps - at Stary Bikhov, in one transition from 7-th Division. Platov also arrived there with a purpose to pass over Dnepr in this point and to move along left shore on connection with 1-st Western army. Bagration assumed to attack the opponent on July, 12. By this time he intended to concentrate in area to the south of Mogilyov all his armies. In connection with forthcoming fight Bagration temporarily asked Platov to postpone a ferry of corps through Dnepr. In the meantime Davout, having found out about intentions of Bagration, has begun looking for battle place to detain Russian army. Taking into account presence in its structure of significant cavalry and artillery forces, Davout has selected a position at Saltanovka. The position had extent about two kilometers and was limited from the east by Dnepr, and from the west - by forests. From front it was covered by a spring Saltanovka which proceeded from northwest on a southeast in a ravine and ran to Dnepr. Davout has occupied the specified position, having the following fighting order. On right flank, at fatova, five battalions of the 108-th and one battalion of 85-th linear regiments were settled down. On the left flank, at Saltanovka, there were three battalions of 85-th linear regiment. Behind the right flank, between villages Fatova and Selen, four battalions of 61-st linear regiment, were located and at village Solets the general reserve stood in structure of 5-th Cuirassiers division, rests of the 3rd Jager Regiment and two battalions of 61-st and 85-th linear regiments. About 7 pm on July, 11 avant guarde of 7-th corps of Russian army in structure of 6-th and 42-nd Jager regiments began offensive from Saltanovka direction. Having rejected sentry posts of the opponent, it has reached the bridge at 8 pm. Despite of a strong gun and artillery fire, which opponent conducted from a left coast, the Jagers under command of colonel Glebov overcome the bridge and continued to be advanced, but soon, attacked by the 85-th regiment of the French, were compelled to depart back. Having arrived to a battle place and estimated situation, Rayevsky was convinced of difficulty of realization of attack on the given direction, and also has clearly seen threat to the left flank of the corps from the opponent forces located at Fatova. In this connection he made decision to attack the French armies simultaneously in directions on Saltanovka and Fatova, and the main forces were intended for approach to the first direction, and parts of 26-th infantry division of general Paskevich - on the second. According to the accepted decision, 26-th infantry division was ordered to make maneuver on a narrow wood footpath aside Fatova and to attack French armies. The beginning of this attack should serve as a signal for transition in approach of the main forces of 7-th infantry corps. Division of Paskevich has acted on performance of a task in view by one column. Two battalions of Orlov and Nizhniy Novgorod Regiments with 12 artillery were put ahead, further followed Poltava Regiments, Ladoga Regiment, 1 battalion of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regiment and a cavalry, which brought up the rear. At the approach to Fatova in a wood, battalions of the 20-th infantry division have met a battalion of the 85 th regiment of the opponent. This battalion which has been put forward on the right coast of the spring, intended for attack in flank of the Russian forces moving to Saltanovka. Russian Jagers have detained progress of the French battalion and removed it from a wood. To the aid of this battalion, the French command has directed a battalion of 108-th Regiment. Both french battalions lacated at height to the south from Fatoba in a columns with a shooting circuit ahead. Paskevich, having developed on a marge of a wood battalions of Orlov and Nizhniy Novgorod regiments, has ordered to attack the opponent resolutely. Russian battalions with a shout "Hurrah" have overturned the opponent and, pursuing him, have seized Fatova. Put forward on height to the south from Fatova 12 canons supported the attack of infantry battalions. After an exit from a village, Russian battalions were suddenly attacked by four battalions of the 108-th regiment, that were stealthily laying in neigh. A fierce hand-to-hand fight took place, in which despite shown exclusive courage and heroism, Russians were compelled to start a withdrawal. Almost simultaneously with transition in approach of battalions of Orlov and Nizhniy Novgorod Regiments, the Poltava Regiment have began offensives. At first its attack developed successfully. Regiment has passed spring at the bridge and attacked facing to the west from Fatova a battalion of the 108-th French regiment. However soon the opponent has entered into fight two battalions of 61-st regiment which put impact in Poltava regiment's flank and have forced it to recede. In the meantime Paskevich has put forward on height 6 more caons, has deployed Ladoga Regiment at height to the west of road, and allocated rifle men further to the west, in a wood. These troops have broken all attempts of the opponent to forward over the spring on the left flank and in the centre. On right flank, two French battalion, pursuing battalions of the Orlov and Nizhniy Novgorod Regiments departing from the left shore, imanaged to cross the spring and to capture the right flank of Paskevich's division. With the purpose to liquidate the threat which has hung above the right flank, Paskevich has put forward against the French battalions Poltava Regiment, behind of which has put the four-cannon battery. The French resolutely attacked Poltava Regiment. The last slowly began to recede on the battery. After approaching to battery, it has quickly parted in both sides, and coming columns of the opponent appeared in front of the Russian battery. Russian gunners met the enemy with pernicious fire. After it, infantrymen of the Poltava Regiment attacked the French battalions and have rejected them to the left shore. While there were these events, on a direction of actions of the main forces of 7-th case there was following situations. For approach on Saltanovka general Rayevsky has deployed a column from Smolensk infantry Regiment, which was one of the best regiments of the corps, and has arranged it on road. The column should seize a dam and provide approach of other forces of the corps. Approach of a column was provided with 6-th and 42-nd Jager Regiments, put forward to a dam and also with the artillery located at height on both sides of road. Owing to different reasons, approach on Saltanovka began not simultaneously with approach on Fatova as it was provided by the plan, but much later. Approach of the Smolensk Regiment in Saltanovka direction was met by strong fire of the opponent. Russian armies have not trembled and continued to be advanced courageously. The French command, aspiring to break attack of Russian column, has thrown against it a battalion of the 85-th regiment. This battalion has passed the spring below the bridge, with an intention to strike in the right flank of Russian column. Rayevsky has found out the threat of sudden impact of the opponent from the right flank only when the column headed by him approached to a dam. This threat was so dangerous, that Rayevsky was compelled to turn a column from a dam aside an enemy battalion. As a result of persistent fight, Smolensk regiment has crushed French battalion. From captured, seized during the fight, Rayevsky found out, that on a direction of actions of the 7-th infantry division, the French command concentrated the basic forces of Davout's army in structure up to five divisions. In a kind of the obvious superiority of forces of the opponent, and also considering, that operations of the 7-th infantry Division under Saltanovka have held down French troops and by that have carried out a task put before them, Rayevsky did not dare to renew attack and has given an order on a withdrawal. Bagration has approved this decision. Under Rayevsky's order, the 7-th infantry corps under covering of rearguards went to Dashkovka in night for July, 12. Losses of Rayevsky's corps were 2548 persons killed, wounded and disappeared. The french has lost 4134 men. Russian armies have shown in this fight an exclusive heroism and courage. General Raevsky reported to Bagration: "A united bravery and diligence of the Russian armies might relieve me from the destruction by the superior enemy and in a such unprofitable place for me; I witness that many officers and soldiers being wounded twice and having tied up these, came back in battle as on a feast. I must praise bravery and art of gunners: in this day everyone was a hero... " In the order to the 2-nd Western army from July, 13, 1812, Bagration has declared gratitude to generals, officers and all troops, participated in fight under Saltanovka. 409 soldiers and officers were awarded. With the purpose to enter the opponent in error concerning the further actions of Russian army, Bagration has ordered to the 7th corps to be at Dashkovka during 12 of June, and asked Platov to direct entrusted to him cosscak Corps on connection with 1-st Western army on the left shore of Dnepr by Mogilyov. In Bagration's opinion, it should assure the French command that Russian are going to renew attack to Mogilyov both from the east, and from the south. On July, 12 Cossacks had forwarded through Dnepr at Vorkolabov and set on a direction specified by Bagration. This very day the 7-th infantry corps remained at Dashkovka. The French, expecting attacks of the opponent, was at Mogilyov and did not undertake any movements. In the meantime at Novy Bikhov construction of the bridge was completed, and on July, 13 a ferry of 8-th infantry and 4-th cavalry corps has began..On next day 7-th infantry corps has departed from Dashkovka and has made a ferry through Dnepr and began movement after the main forces of army. The flank march of 2-nd Western army from Novy Bikhov to Smolensk was covered on the part of Mogilyov with a strong veil of Cossack Regiments. The army moved on route Propoysk-Cherykov-Krychev-Mstyslav-Khyslavichy-Smolensk. On July, 22 the 2nd Western army arrived to Smolensk where since July, 20 there stood the 1st Western army. Connection of both armies has taken place. The plan of Napoleon designed for destruction of Russian army, was broken. The deviation maneuver of the 2nd Western army from Volkovysk to Smolensk during the Great Patriotic War of 1812 belongs to number of remarkable events in a history of military art. Bagration showed an outstanding sample of a strategic management of armies in difficult fighting conditions. For 35 days, army of Bagration, constantly having the enemy in rear and on flank, have passed more than 750 kms. Daily transitions reached at times 35-40 kms. " Even the great Suwaroff would be surprised by those hardships people are experinced nowadays and the speed of marches of 2-nd army, in all time done on sandy roads and marshy places. . ." - Bagration wote. Skilfully maneuvering on a battlefield and waging persistent rear guard fights, the Russian army uder Bagration, have managed to upset plans of Napoleon and to leave from under impact of superior forces of the enemy. The Marche - maneuver of 2-nd Western army finished by its connection in Smolensk with 1-st Western army, was highly estimated by the contemporaries. So, the military writer of first half XIX in. N.A.Okunev specified: "Looking at a map and taking in hands for check a compasses, it is easy to be convinced, even at a superficial sight, how little chances were left to prince Bagration for the achievement of this connection. I consider, as you see, person by its acts, and Prince. Bagration by his actions and consequently, I shall be alllowed, to set one question: Whether ever any general was put in more emergency conditions and whether any militarian has left similar position with the greater honour? ". N.V.Golitsyn, one of aide-de-camps of Bagration, also has fairly noticed: "Fast and skilful movement to which we are obliged for connection of Russian armies near Smolensk, puts him (Bagration) in number of saviors of Russia in 1812". The French command, which did not manage to prevent connection of the 2-nd army with the 1-st Western army, gave due to skilful actions of Russian armies. On Bagration's words, even "skilful Napoleon was surprised" by the march of the 2nd Western army. After connection of the 1-st and the 2-nd Western armies in Smolensk favorable conditions for transition to offensive actions were created. Armies of Napoleon were scattered, its advanced parts were send in area Rudny, and the others were on a march. It allowed to put defeat to the opponent in parts, and Russian command has decided to take advantage. In these purposes it has undertaken offensive on July 26. The main impact was rendered on Rudny where parts of the Murat's 3 rd cavalry corps were located at that time. The decision of Russian command quite answered conditions. At fast and resolute actions it was possible to expect for route of Murat. However Barclay de Tolly has not shown necessary resoluteness. Soon the direction of the main impact was transferred on Porechye, and on August, 1 again on Rudny. Napoleon has taken advantage of a sluggishness of actions of Russian command and has managed to concentrate to Smolensk a great bulk of the armies. On August, 1 the French armies were forwarded through Dnepr (in 70-80 kms to the west of Smolensk) and have led approach to Smolensk, through Lyadi and Krasny, having ordered to leave for rear to Russian armies and to cut off its ways of deviation to Moscow. Russian armies were compelled to stop approach and have begun to concentrate in Smolensk. Against French troops approaching to Krasny, at first a group of Neverovsky was put forward, and then 7-th infantry corps of Rayevsky, which restrained persevering attacks of the opponent, aspiring to break to Smolensk, on August, 4. On 5 August Napoleon assumed to give Russian army near Smolensk a decisive battle. In a kind of an adverse ratio of forces and danger of detour of Smolensk armies of the opponent, Russian army has left Smolensk in night for August, 5 and was set to the east on the Moscow road. Defense of Smolensk was assigned to 6-th infantry corps of Dokhturov with divisions of Neverovskyi and Konovnitsyn. In the persistent battle which has begun on August, 5, Russians have resisted to all attacks of the French armies and have kept city. Successfully having executed a task in view, Dokhturov have left Smolensk in night for August, 6and joined the main forces of Russian army. After abandon of Smolensk, the continuation of deviation of Russian armies already caused resolute protests. Some blamed the imperial government and Barclay de Tolly, as commander 1-st army and military minister for not accepting vigorous measures for preparation of forces to repulse the enemy. Being the supporter of the offensive strategy, Bagration insisted on more active militay actions against Napoleon. He was particurlaly irated by the leadership of the Russian Army by Barclay de Tolly. Bagration have appealed several times to Barclay for providing him with an information on future plans of the Military command, but all his claim were left without reply. "I wrote to you twice, but there is no answer - Bagration informed the chief of a staff of 1-st army general Ermolov - I kindly ask to report to minister where does he make a direction of army? I wrote to him, but there is no answer. I do not understand, what does it mean, what for you run so and where do you hasten?... What is happening with you, for what do you neglect me? It is not right time to joke. If I write, it is necessary to answer ". In another letter to Ermolov, characterizing the chaos reigned in armies, Bagration declared: "Really, it is easy to get mad from all these absurdity". Bagration sharply criticized Barclay de Tolly for his divergence. The tense relations between both commanders have reached the maximum point. "I can not be together with minister in any way - declared Bagration. - For God's sake, send me anywhere you want, to cammand over Regiment in Moldova, or to Caucasus, but I can not be here; And all headquarters is filled with Germans so, that . . . it is impossible to live and no sense to do it". All this rendered the extremely negative influence on operations of armies. For rescue of position it was necessary to unit command by armies in hands of one commander, capable to mobilize economic and moral forces of the country and to crush the enemy. Bagration well understood importance of realization of such action and in the reports to Czar insisted on introduction of one-man management. In this respect he reflected mood of majority of Russian army which demanded assignment of the single commander-in-chief who is enjoying confidence of army. "The order and communication, decent to the comfortable army - wrote Bagration to Alexander - demand always one-man management, and more in present time when business goes about rescue of fatherland, I shall not avoid from exact obedience to the one, whom is destined to subordinate me". Under pressure of public opinion Alexander I was compelled to appoint M.I.Kutusoff as the commander-in-chief all field armies. Assignment of Kutusoff has met hot approval of army and people. All knew him as the remarkable commander which activity was marked by brilliant victories of Russain armies. The majority trusted Kutusoff. "Kutusoff has arrived to beat the French" - spoke then. On 18 August Kutusoff has accepted command of army and since this day vigorously began to draft the strategic plan of war. Taking into account aspiration of Napoleon to achieve outcome of war by decisive battle, he dare to oppose him more appropriate to conditions of application of mass armies a way of the decision of outcome of war by system of consecutive battles. The great value in business of successful conducting war Kutusoff gave to reserves. Therefore right after the assignment he has become interested in a question on available reserves. Having found out, that reserves actually are not presented, Kutusoff has made the decision on withdrawn of army, then to exhaust the opponent in defensive fights, to strengthen own army by reserves, to change a ratio of forces in the advantage, and then to proceed in counterattack and to crush army of Napoleon. While the Russian army continued deviation to the east in accordance with the plan of Kutusoff, in the territory occupied by the French armies, the guerrilla spontaneously arisen and its flame inflamed more and more. Bagration from the very beginning of war has correctly understood its features and national character. He specified: "Nowadays the war is not ordinary, but National". That is why Bagration has considered the spontaneously arisen guerrilla with the great approval. In the letter to Rostopchyn on August, 14 from village Lusky (near Vyazma) he wrote: "Smolensk province shows patriotism rather well; Local muzhiks (peasants) beat the French as pigs where only come across in small commands". Explanation of character of war has resulted in Bagration's decision that the unique means to detain progress of Napoleon in depth of Russia and to put him defeat is a guerrilla movement and its joint actions with Russian regular army. "To me it seems that there is no other a way but, without reaching two marches up to Moscow, to gather all people and army and with a cold steel, peaks, sabres and to pull hard on them (french)... " -- he wrote to the governor of Moscow Rostopchyn. Bagration's views on a role of guerrilla movement in war against the French was shared by his former aide-de-camp, commander of the Akhtyrsk hussar Regiment vicecolonel D.V.Davydov. Davydov has addressed to Bagration with the letter in which asked of the sanction to allocate from structure of Russian army a small group for actions in rear of the French armies. On August, 21 Bagration has invited Davydov. It was at Kolotsk monastery in 12 kms to the west from Borodino, where then the headquarters of the 2-nd Western army settled down. Bagration has listened to reasons Denysov on possible character of actions of guerrilla group and has approved his intentions. Together with it, Bagration has agreed that determined by Kutusoff number of people was not enough. Thus he has added: "I do not understand fears His Brightness. Whether it is necessary to bargain because of several hundreds persons when business goes that in case of good luck, he may deprive the enemy of all supplies. . . . In case of failure, he will lose only a handful of people. How to be, war is not for kisses". Davydov has assured, that he warrants for integrity of group. "For this purpose, only boldness in attacks, resoluteness in abrupt cases and caution on halts and lodgings for the night are necessary; for this I shall do my best... Only, I repeat, the number of people is too limited, give me 1000 cossacks, and you will see, that will be" - has told Davydov. "I would give you at first time 3000 of them - have answered Bagration - for I do not like to act superficially, but can not even speak about it; Knyaz has defined force of a group himself; it is necessary to obey". After that Bagration has sat down and wrote with own hand the following instruction to Davydov: "To Vicecolonel of Akhtyrsk Hussar Regiment Davydov. After reception of this, take hundred fifty cossacks from general-major Karpov's and fifty hussar of the Akhtyrsk hussar Regiment. I order to take all measures to disturb the enemy and to try to take away its supplies not only from flanks, but in middle and in rear, to upset transports and parks, to break ferries and to take away all remedies. In a word to tell, I am sure, that having made to you such an important allowance, you shall prove your quickness and diligence and that will justify my choice. You can sent official reports to me at every convenient chance you will have; Nobody should know about your movements and try to have them in the most impenetrable secret. As if to up to the foodstuffs of your command, you should take care about it yourself...". Then Bagration write letters to generals Vasilchikov and Karpov about allocation of the best cossacks and the hussars. Having informed by Davydov, that he has no a map of Smolensk province, Bagration has given him an own map. On farewell Bagration has told Davydov, that he hoped on success of the conceived affair. Hopes of Bagration were justified. Guerrilla movement has soon received wide scope. Beside Davydov's group, groups under command of general Dorokhov, captain Fisher, captain Seslavin, colonel Kudashev and others were created. These groups successfully struggled with the French, combining the actions with peasant guerrilla groups. The given facts testify that Bagration was one of the first among the commanders of Russian army of that time, who has paid attention to necessity to develop guerrilla movement and use of peasants and regular military parts. Bagration was the first during that war who organized the first military unit for conducting guerrilla movement. He also was the author of the first instruction in which has precisely defined purposes of this group and character of its actions. On August, 22 Russian army has left in area Borodino. Under order of Kutusoff active preparation for forthcoming battle began on a favourable defensive position. The position choosed by kutusoff, occupied 8 kms on front. Its first line passed on line Maslovo, Gorky, Borodino, Semyenovskoe, Utytsa. The right flank of a position adjoined to the Moscow-river at Maslovo, and the left flank - to almost impassable Utytsk forest. The centre was based on Kurgan height. The Borodino position covered two important ways which went to Moscow- New Smolensk road and Old Smolensk road on which the army of Napoleon moved. Kutusoff highly estimated the Borodino position. In the report to Alexander dated on August, 23 1812 he wrote to Alexander: " the position in which I have stopped at a village Borodino in 12 miless forward Mozhaisk, is one of the best that only on flat places is possible to find... It Is desirable, that the enemy attack us in this positions then I have the big hope to a victory". The most vulnerable site of the Borodino position was its left flank. Kutusoff well understood it and in the report to Alexander wrote: " the weak place of this position is located on the left flank, and I shall try to correct it ". Kutusoff has put the most proof armies of the 2-nd Western army of Bagration on the left flank. Besides he has ordered to strengthen this flank by earthen constructions. At Semyenovskoe, three redoubts, the so called "fleshies" ("fleshy" - a field strengthening which sides form a stupid outgoing corner), were constructed, that received subsequently the name of "Bagration's fleshies", as during the Borodino battle Bagration's troops courageously defended them. To the west from Semyenovskoe an advanced strengthening, the so called Shevardyn Redoubt was located. At Kurgan height there was 18-cannon battery known under the name of "Rayevsky's battery". Kutusoff intended to wage a defensive battle with Napoleon, to make possible big losses with the purpose of changing of a ratio of forces in the advantage and in a case of a favorable outcome to proceed in approach against French army. The fighting order of Russian army consisted of the right wing, the centre, the left wing and reserves. On a right wing from Maslovo up to Gorky the 2nd and the 4th infantry and 2nd cavalry corps were deployed. In the centre - from Gorky up to Kurgan heights - Kutusoff has put the 6th infantry and 3rd cavalry corps. The general command by armies of the right wing and the centre was assigned on Barclay de Tolly. On the left, most dangerous wing, armies of Bagration were settled down: the 7 th and 8 th infantry and 4 th cavalry corps. The area of Utizy was defended by six Cossack Regiments under Karpov. Here Kutusoff has ordered to arrange also the 3 rd infantry corps under command of N. A.Tuchkov, having put it almost perpendicular to the 8th infantry corps. The opurpose of the 3rd infantry corps was to be in readiness to operate in flank and rear to napoleonic armies. However the chief of Kutusoff's staff general Bennigsen has broken performance of this order. On the eve of battle he has put Tuchkov;s corps in front to the opponent that did not corresponded to an order assigned by Kutusoff. The great attention was given by Kutusoff to creation and the savings of reserves. "... Reserves - he specified - should be saved as long as possible, since the general who will keep still a reserve, is not defeated". Bagration also considered the presence of reserves as extremely necessary. In the order to the army on the eve of the Borodino battle he wrote: "Ii is necessary to have strong reserves and to locate them as close as possible to strengthenings". Kutusoff had in reserve the following troops: the 5-th infantry corps and 1st Cuirassier Division, settled down at Knyazkov. The artillery reserve (306 canons) was assembled at Psarev. These forces made the main reserve which might be used as on a right wing and in the centre, and on the left wing. Besides each wing had special reserves. A reserve of the right wing was made by 9 Cossack Regiments under M.I.Platov and the 1st Cavalry Corps under F. P.Uvarov. The reserve of the left wing consisted of the 2nd Grenadier and the 2 nd Cuirassier Divisions, the Don artillery and a separate artillery reserve of the left wing. This reserve was arranged to the east from Semyenovskoe. Having considered Russian positions, Napoleon has decided to strike on the left flank of fighting construction of Russain army, to break through here its defense, to leave in rear and to destroy, having pressed to the Moscow - river. Napoleon has concentrated a great bulk of the army on a direction of the main impact. Corps of Murat, Davout, Ney and Junot were located here. With the purpose of concealing direction of the main impact, Napoleon planned demonstrative actions against Borodino and Utizy. On August, 24 there was a fight for Shevardyn Redoubt. Napoleon has set against it 30 thousand infantries, 10 thousand cavalrymen and 186 canons. Russian has opposed them 8 thousand infantries, 4 thousand cavalrymen with 36 canons. Both sides were fighting with a great courage and boldness. After several attacks French managed to seize redoubt. Then Bagration sent two divisions to assist defenders of the redoubt, which beat out the French by vigorous counterattack. On next day in the order to Russian army Kutusoff wrote: "the hot affair, happened yesterday on the left flank, finished to a glory of the Russian army". Fight for Shevardyn Redoubt had a big value. It has provided Russian army with an opportunity to finish erection of the basic engineering constructions on the Borodino position. Simultaneously this fight has made clear Napoleon's intention to put main impact against left wing of Russian army. Considering, that Russian armies have carried out the task put before them, Kutusoff has ordered Bagration to allocate armies from Shevardyn redoubt. With approach of darkness Bagration's troops have left redoubt and occupied defense position on Borodino. During August, 25 (6 September) both parties made last preparations for forthcoming battle. The French army totaled in 135 thousand men and 587 canons. (W.Sloane in his book "Life of Napoleon wrote that "He had a hundred and twenty-eight thousand men at hand, and six thousand more within reach".) In Russian army there were 120 thousand soldiers and 640 canons. The Borodino battle began on dawn of August, 26 (7 September) by a powerful artillery cannonade from both sides. Then approach of the French on Borodion has followed, which was in front of the Russian positions and was defended by Jagers. The Jagers after firm resistance were compelled to move to river Kalacha under an impact of superior forces of the enemy. These attacks of the French carried demonstrative character. The main events were developed at "Bagration's fleshies" and at battery of Rayevsky. About at 6 am, an army of marshal Davout have attacked Bagration's positions. It had up to 25 thousand men and was supported by 102 canons. "Bagration's fleshies" were defended by the Summary Grenadier Division under command of Vorontsov and the 27 th infantry division under leadership of Neverovsky. In total there were 8 thousand Russians and 50 canons. Despite of the threefold superiority of the opponent over people and double - in artilleries, Russians had high moral spirit and confidence in the forces. "In their first onset they advanced like devotees, with the cry, "God have mercy upon us!" and, as each forward rank went down before the relentless invaders, those behind pressed onward over the bodies of their comrades." - wrote W. Sloagne in his book "Life of Napoleon". Russians have met attacking columns of the French with a strong artillery fire. Simultaneously Russian Jagers, scattered in front of fleshies, have opened gun fire on the opponent. The enemy has not sustained storm fire of Russian armies and, leaving a lot of killed and wounded, has receded in the disorder. The first attack of the French on "Bagration's fleshies" has choked. At 7 am the French has renewed attacks. With the big losses they managed to grasp left fleshies. However under order of Bagration some battalions of 27-th infantry division vigorously counterattacked the opponent in flank. The French were beat off and suffered new heavy losses. The second attack on "Bagration's fleshies" also has finished in failure for the French. Napoleon was struck with persistent resistance of Bagration's troops. He has supported Davout with corps of Ney and Junot and Murat's cavalry and has given an order to attack "Bagration's fleshies" in third time. In his turn, Bagration has considerably strengthened his positions. He has put forward in this area the reserve - 2nd Grenadier and 2 nd Cuirrassier divisions. Also he has directed here 8 battalions from the 7 th corps of Raevsky that were deployed to the north from fleshies. Besides Bagration put the 3 rd infantry division of Konovnitsyn at Semyenovskoe. Kutusoff who was watching closely development of battle at "Bagration's fleshies", has sent large reserves on strengthening Bagration's positions. He ordered to throw on the left wing the 2-nd and a part of 5-th infantry corps, and also 100 canons from the main artillery reserve. However relocation of these forces might be carried out not earlier, than in l-2 hours. Therefore Bagrationi might rely only for his own forces during the next enemy attack. At 8 am after powerful artillery fire, the third attack on "Bagration's fleshies" began. The French managed to rush in right and left fleshies. However on this time Bagration's troops have beaten them out from there by a prompt counterattack and restored position by 9 am. Simultaneously with the third attack, the forces of Poniatowski's corps attacked Utizy with the purpose to leave for rear of army of Bagration, but the 3rd infantry corps of Tuchkov has repulsed this attack and, thus, has broken roundabout maneuver of the opponent. Napoleon was in fury from new failure. He has strengthened Davout's and Ney's corps by sending corps of Murat and at 9 am the French have undertaken the fourth attack. They has managed to seize fleshies and village Semyenovskoe. However to this time the 2nd and 5th corps that were sent for strengthening of 2 nd army of Bagration, began to arrive. Bagration throw all his forces against the French. The French armies were again rejected with the big losses for them. Fourth attack "Bagration's fleshies" also has finished in failure. Without considering suffered losses, Napoleon decided to to seize "Bagration's fleshies" by all means. At 10 am the French has undertaken the fifth attack; at 10.30 am - the sixth; at 11 - the seventh. (!!!) However all these attacks were rebuffed. With a view of counteraction to an impact of the French, Kutusoff continued to strengthen armies of the left wing. He has thrown there the 4 th infantry and 2nd cavalry corps. Besides he has prepared courageous maneuver with the purpose of impact on the left flank and rear of the opponent. For performance of this task he choose Coossack Regiments of Platov and 1-st Cavalry corps of Uvarov. At 12 am the French have started the eighth attack on "Bagration's fleshies". By this time against 18 thousand soldiers and 300 canons of Bagration, Napoleon has set 45 thousand men with 400 canons. At that moment, Bagration has decided to meet the enemy by decisive impact. Fierce counter hand-to-hand fight was fastened. Military historian Buturlin, the participant of this fight, wrote: "An awful combat took place, in which from both sides miracles of almost supernatural bravery were made. The infantry, cavalrymen and gunners of both sides, having got mixed up together, represented an awful show of a wrong bulk of the soldiers altercating in private with furiousness of despair". It was exactly this moment when Bagration was fatally wounded. The splinter of the French grenade has struck him in a leg and has reset from a horse. But Bagration has not lost courage. "When he was wounded - wrote N.B.Golitsyn - he, despite of the sufferings, wanted to wait for consequences of attack of the second cuirrasier division and to make sure with own eyes of its success; after that, having felt sincere simplification, he left a battle-field". The message about Bagration's injury has made confusion in armies. The management of armies was broke and under pressure of superior forces of the enemy Russians were compelled to depart. " This unfortunate occasion - wrote Kutuzov to Alexander - has rather upset successful action of the left our wing, hitherto having a superiority above the enemy..." After wounding of Bagration, temporary command of armies of the left wing has taken up by Konovnitsyn who was soon replaced by Dokhturov. Russian armies retreated and occupied Semyenovskoe. "Bagration's fleshies" have remained in hands of the French. Napoleon has decided to enter into battle the reserve - Imperial Guard and to complete break of a position of Russian army. Position was exclusively intense. At this time under order of Kutusoff, Platov and Uvarov have bypassed the left flank of Napoleon's army and have undertaken sudden attack in area Valuem, Bezubovo. The panic in a transport and among troops of the left flank has forced Napoleon to stop attacks against the 2nd Western army and to distract for setback of sudden attack for two hours. This fact has allowed Kutusoff to rearrange the armies and to strengthen the centre and the left wing. The new attempts undertaken by Napoleon to break through defense of Russian armies had no success. Napoleon managed only to grasp the battery of Rayevsky. By the end of day Russian army strongly stood on the Borodino position. Having convinced of futility of the attacks, Napoleon has given an order to allocate armies on an initial boundary. So famous Borodino battle was finished. Kutusoff informed Alexander about its results on August, 29 (September, 10) 1812: "This battle, that took place on 26-th, was the most bloody was of all that are known in newest times. The place of fight is gained by us completely, and the enemy retired then in that position in which has come to attack us". The question of a victory in the Borodino battle always caused fierce contradiction. To my mind, Napoleon won the Borodino battle, but at the same time, lost the whole campaign. Therefore, the Borodino battle was a great victory of Russian army. As a result of battle serious losses were put to the opponent and the plan of Napoleon to crush Russian army in decisive battle was broken. The French army has lost about 58 thousand soldiers from 135 thousand men. Losses of Russian army have made about 44 thousand soldiers. Especially considerable role in the Borodino battle have played armies under command of Bagration. Operating on a direction of the main impact of the opponent, they have courageously repulsed numerous attacks of the enemy and in many respects promoted the general victory of Russian army. "This day - wrote Kutusoff, - will be an eternal monument of courage and excellent bravery of the Russian soldiers, where all infantry, cavalry and artillery fought desperately. The desire of everyone was to die on a place and to not concede to the enemy. The French army under leadership of Napoleon, being in the superior forces, has not overcome determination of the Russian soldier endowing with a courage its life for the fatherland". After a victory gained in the Borodino battle, Russian army prepared for transition in approach with the purpose of final route of Napoleon's army. However the big losses and absence of necessary reserves for development of approach have compelled commander-in-chief Kutusoff to give an order on a withdrawal to Moscow. It enabled Russian army to fill losses and to continue war in more favourable conditions. "... When business goes not about glories of the fights won only, but all purposes are directed on destruction of the French army... I have taken intention to recede... " - informed Kutusoff Alexander. With a deviation of Russian army from Borodino the new period of the Grea patriotic War of 1812 has begun. In this period Russian army under the leadership of Kutusoff has skilfully carried out a flank march to Tarutino, finished there preparation for wide offensive actions and, having pass in a resolute counterattack, defeated Napoleon's armies. Bagration was not fated to participate in all these events. Evacuated to a village. Simy in Vladimir province, he has died there from the received wound on September, 14, ( 26 ) 1812. The account of his days has stopped, not achieving complete 47 years. On September, 17, in day of funeral Bagrationa, the general-aide-de-camp Sen-Pry was the only from Bagration's close people on mourning ceremony in Simy. And that only because, being itself wounded, appeared on vicinity on treatment. On 25th anniversary of the Borodino battle, which was celebrated rather solemnly, it was decided to set up on a battlefield a memorable obelisk in honour of falling heroes. Then famous Denis Davydov, who has offered emperor Nikolay to transfer ashes of the great commander and the hero of war of 1812 to bottom of this monument, was still alive. So the place worthy to great Bagration was finally determined. There is Peter Bagrationa's huge share in a victory of Russian army in the Great Patriotic War of 1812. The Russian armies, under his command, have put serious defeats on French armies by the skilful actions during deviation and during the Borodino fight. Bagration took place in history of military art as the remarkable commander who has brought in the large contribution to development of advanced ways of conducting the armed struggle. He has shown outstanding examples of the skilful decision of complex) strategic and tactical tasks on various battlefields. " Suwaroff's disciple - wrote about Bagration S.G.Volkonsky - he never betray to the instructor and up to the end of life was a Glory of the Russian army" Being the talented representative of the Suwaroff's strategy, Bagration together with other progressive figures of Russian army of the end XVIII - the beginnings XIX centuries. was a carrier of advanced military ideas of that time. Highly gifted by nature, the person of "wise and flexible mind", he has given the practical decision of some radical problems. In the field of strategy, the one of the sharpest questions was a definition of ways of achievement of a fast and resolute victory above the opponent. Then out-of-date prussian, positional strategy was still "alive", however new strategic sights affirmed on behalf of Napoleonic and Suwaroff's strategy went on its change. As against adherents the positional strategy, who gave deciding value to struggle for fortresses and the communications of the opponent, supporters of new strategic sights brought to the forefront idea the destruction of opponent's alive force in open field battles. They rejected the requirement of old strategy about equal distribution of forces and means on a battlefield for maintenance of all directions and persistently carried out an idea on necessity of massing of forces and means on the major strategic directions for drawing distressed impact on the enemy as best means of achievement of a fast and complete victory. Conductors of new resolute strategy in Russian army was A.V.Suwaroff and whole group of his followers, among whom was Bagration. Bagration's practice has given many vivid examples of the skilful decision of tasks in view of new strategy. Especially evidently it was showed in his actions in the rank of the commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army and during the Great Patriotic War of 1812. Bagration acted as the commander-innovator putting before Russian army resolute strategic tasks and rejecting becoming obsolete positional strategy. The forms of the armed struggle used by Bagration corresponded to his advanced sights on character of a strategy. Under his command the Russian armies gave instructive examples of conducting offensive and defensive actions. If conditions developed adversely, Bagration used also such compelled form of conducting military actions, as deviation. But he considered as the basic form of conducting the armed struggle an offensive actions, for only by approach it was possible to achieve route of alive force of the opponent and to achieve the strategic purpose in the shortest terms. "... In all cases - wrote Bagration - I prefer offensive war to a defensive one " Strategic views of Bagration defined also his sights on character of tactical actions of armies. It is possible to estimate these sights, for example, on axample of the famous order to armies of 2-nd Western army dated on June, 25, 1812. In the order, written by Bagration with own hand, instructions were given to the 2nd Western army concerning a way of actions against the French armies invaded on territory of Russia. "To us - it was spoken in the order - it is necessary to attack them bravely, quickly, to not be engaged in shootings; artillery must fire precisely; irregullar armies must try to surround their flanks and rear . . . . The regular cavalry attacks quickly, but rather harmonous, without dividing. Squadrons must support each other in attack, having covered reserves and flanks. The cavalry should be located under the chess order". Attack should be conducted, having armies constructed in columns. "Commanders of Corps - wrote Bagration - must try and turn all attention on attacking the enemy with bayonets in columns and to attack till its deviation. The horse artillery should operate strongly, equally as a cavalry, but rather harmonous, without the slightest confusion. It is rather necessary in the case, when the enemy will have strong reserves and may confuse attacking forces; and for that we must try to have armies in columns and in readiness, and as soon as everyone turn into flight, then cossacks must prick them, while regular must support closefisted and rather harmoniously". Bagration recommended to deploy army in the fighting order not too close, but in a way that soldiers might concern each other elbows. On a case of counterattacks of a cavalry of the opponent Bagration offered to arrange "carres". "When the enemy cavalry will attack infantry - was spoken in the order - that a same minute to construct either a column closed from all sides, or a battalion in a carre". With the purpose of increasing enthusiasm of armies, all attacks should be made with a shout, during approach to beat drums and to play a music. Similar sights were stated Bagrationii in a number of other orders, instructions and letters. In particular, for the characteristic of his tactical sights may serve also the "Manual to infantry officers in day of battle". This document was made on a basis of "Manuals to officers of Narva infantry Regiment" which author was M.S.Vorontsov serving during the Great Patriotic War 1812 in 2-nd Western army of Bagrationa. Under the witness of military historian P.Simansky, Vorontsov's manual "as made under strong influence of Suwaroff's precepts, was appraised by the most favourite disciple of Suwaroff, Prince Bagration, then it was slightly corrected by him, as in some places it concerned only Narva infantry Regiment, and then in July, 1812 it was dispatched to all troops of 2-nd army" . "Manual to infantry officers in day of battle" recognized as the basic kind of fight an offensive fight. The main perfomance of fight was a bayonet attack, coming up to the end with a vigorous prosecution of the crushed opponent. "Manual" considered in detail a question on actions separate linesand in columns, about conducting aimed fire. The necessity of maintenance by shooters of a close communication with columns was specified; movement forward was determined only by an order of the chief of division or battalion. If it was necessary to operate in separate line in forests , it was offered to hold a reserve behind one of flanks in order to have an opportunity to put sudden flank impact on counterattacking opponent. Attack of an enemy cavalry acting in separate line should be met by fire, having admitted the opponent on 150 steps. After that it was necessary to be divided on small groups of 10 persons and to repulse the opponent by fire and bayonets up to the approach of reinforcements. Upon approaching, reinforcements had to be reconstructed from a column into carre, firing on an enemy cavalry from a distance in 150 steps. "Manual" demanded from officers to show constant care of soldiers, to remind their duties and the oath, to explain what was required from the them during military actions. The special attention was addressed on maintenance in armies of belief by virtue of "Russian bayonets", a spirit of boldness, courage and persistence in fight. "The persistence and courage - was spoken in "Manual" - have won more battles, rather than all talents taken altogether" . Dissemination of all panic hearings, like "we are cut off" were categorically forbidden, under a threat of severe punishments. it was specified in "Manual": "Brave people are never cut off; wherever the enemy goes, turn your breast to follow and defeat him". Thus, in the field of tactics, as well as in the field of strategy, Bagration acted as the innovator of new ideas convinced by the supporter of resolute offensive actions He persistently introduced advanced tactics went on change to an obsolete positional tactics, applied tactics of columns in a combination with separate lines. Paying a great attnetion to a value of offensive fight, Bagration at the same time did not reject an opportunity of conducting defensive activity. He creatively approached to the decision of tasks in view, applying such forms of fight, that were exact answers to particular circumstances. His practical inheritance contains the richest experience of conducting an offensive battles as well as development of practice of waging an avant guard and rear guard fights. Bagaration was the unsurpassed master of organization of these extremely complex kinds of fights. And not casually is that at the most responsible and crucial moments of wars of 1799-1807, he was appointed as commander of rear guards and avant guard of the Russian army. The fights, carried out by Russian armies under Bagration's leadership during the Italian campaign of 1799, and also avant guard and rear guard fights during the Swiss campaign of 1799 and wars of Russia with France of 1805-1807 belong to number of the best in Russian military art. Bagration built an education and training processes of soldiers on the basis of the system developed by A.V. Suwaroff. He paied great attention to training and education of armies to prepare the courageous, brave and initiative soldier capable to carry out orders quickly and skillfully. Bagration constantly worried about the soldiers to be health, well dressed and be fed in time. S.G.Volkonsky, which during war of Russia with France of 1806-1807 frequently was in Bagration's group, wrote: "...I visited several times an avant guarde where many of my friends were serving at Prince Bagration's headquarters. Hospitable manner of Prince with subordinates, amicable relations between themselves, harmony, cleanliness in tents, fresh, pleased appearance of the bottom grades - proved Prince's good treatment and attitude to them, and in all the pledge of the general trust to him". Cases of the careless attitude of separate chiefs to the subordinates caused the feeling of deep indignation of Bagration. For example, in the order to armies of the 2nd Western army dated on February, 13, ( 25 ) 1812, Bagration underlined a bad organization of treatment at the 11 th Jager Regiment and specified, that soldiers are left without any attention of careless doctor Baranovich, whom "I order to arrest for one month..." But showing a carefulness of the soldier, Bagration at the same time demanded maintenance of high military discipline, considering it as a foundation of a military service. "In military service - he wrote - the first subject is an order, a subordination, discipline, unanimity and friendship". First of all Bagration was extremely demanded to his own personality. "...To execute a will of sovereign, of the emperor and my commanders is the most sacred obligation to which I follow and obey on every step of my service... I Love soldiers, I respect their bravery, and equally I demand an order, discipline". Armies, commanded by Bagration, were always differed of high discipline and, in some sense, this was one of the main reasons of their brilliant victories over enemies. Bagration's military achievements had brought a huge glory to him. "The God of an army" ("Bog (the God)-rati(army)-on (he is)") - so he was named in Russian army. Bagration's name was widely known not only in Russia, but also is far behind its boundaries. Many outstanding military figures of the Western Europe of that time have highly estimated his military talent. So, in opinion of Polish general Kolachkovsky, one of the participants of 1812 campaign, Bagration "belonged to a number of the most famous military leaders of his time" and might be put in one line with the glorified military commanders like Napoleon, Suwaroff, Kutusoff, Ney, Davout and many others. Napoleon himself considered Bagration as the best general of Russian army. Bibliography 1. General Bagration, Summary of documents and materials, published by Gospolizdat, 1945 (in Russian) 2. The Great Patriotic War 1812, Materials of the Military archive of the General Headquarters, Moscow 1910-1911 3. Field-marshal Kutusoff, "Summary of documents and materials", Moscow, 1947 (in Russian) 4. Denis Davydov, Memoirs, Moscow, 1985 (In Russian) 5. Notes of Aleksey Petrovich Ermolov, part 1 (1801-18120), Moscow, 1865 (in Russian) 6. E. Tarle, "Napoleon's campaign in Russia, 1812", Moscow, 1989 (in Russian) 7. S. Borysov "Bagration", Moscow, published by the Ministry of Defense, 1958 (In Russian) 8. I. Rostunov, "Bagration", Moscow, 1957 (in Russian) 9. V. Zherve, "Heroes of 1812, Barclay de Tolly and Bagration", Moscow (in Russian) 10. A. Jorjadze "Military art of Georgians", Tbilisi, 1989 (In Georgian) 11. B. Sokhvadze "Barclay de Tolly during 1812", Tbilisi, 1995 (In Georgian) 12. Military Encyclopedia, volume IV (in Russian) 13. I. Polosyn "Bagration", Moscow, 1950 14. W. Sloane, "The Life of Napoleon", New York, 1896 (in English) 15. Clauzewitz "Napoleon's russian campaign, 1812", Moscow, 1957 (In Russian) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 2000, design by Logunov Eugene. Creative artel of the Project «1812 year». http://www.museum.ru/museum/1812/